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Atomic Absorption Spectrophotometry (AAS):
AAS is a procedure for quantitatively determining chemical element 
composition by measuring the absorption of optical radiation (light) by 
free atoms in the gaseous state. In analytical chemistry the technique 
is used for determining the concentration of a particular element in a 
sample to be analyzed such as for example the concentration of metals 
in a water sample. 
 
Acoustic Doppler Current Profiler (ADCP)
ACDP is a sonar that measures water current velocities at a range 
of depths. They can be mounted on boats or moorings for short-term 




Adamsite is an organic compound traditionally used as a chemical 
warfare agent. It is an arsenical diphenylaminechlorarsine, an odourless 
crystalline compound, usually dispersed as aerosol and which affects the 
upper respiratory tract. It was first synthesized in Germany in 1915 and 
used during World War I.
 
Baltic Sea Region Strategy (EUSBSR)
Initiated by the European Parliament and coordinated by the European 
Commission, the EUSBSR aims to save the sea and increase prosperity 
in the Baltic Sea Region while shaping the region into a regional 
cooperation model for the whole EU. The implementation of the strategy 
is financed from different EU funds in the area including the Baltic Sea 
Region Programme. The Commission officially launched the Strategy 
and its Action Plan on 10 June 2009 and it was adopted by the European 
Council on the 26 October 2009.
 
Bathymetry
Bathymetry is the study of underwater depth of lake and ocean floors. 
The information for bathymetric maps today usually comes from an 
echosounder (a sonar mounted under a boat which sends a beam of 
sound downward at the seafloor and measures the time it takes for it to 
bounce off the floor and return) or from remote sensing LIDAR/LADAR 




Bioaccumulation refers to the accumulation of substances such as 
chemicals or toxic substances in an organism that occurs when its 
absorption rate is greater than the rate at which the substance is lost. 
It can lead to chronic poisoning even if environmental levels of the toxin 
are not very high. In fish, bioaccumulation can be predicted by models. 
 
Biohazard
A biological hazard refers to a biological substance that poses a threat to 
the health of living organisms.
 
Biomarker
A biological marker is an indicator of a biological state. It is a characteristic 
that is measured and evaluated as an indicator of normal biological or 
pathogenic processes. Biomarkers are used to indicate an exposure to 
chemicals in the environment by an organism.
 
Blister agent
A blister agent, also known as a vesicant, is a chemical compound 
causing severe skin, eye and mucosal pain and irritation, as do many 
chemical warfare agents. There are three groups of blister agents: 1) 
Sulphur mustards (including mustard gas), 2) Nitrogen mustards, and 




Munitions containing chemical agents.
 
Chemical warfare agents (CWA)
CWAs are chemical substances whose toxic properties are used to kill, 
injure or incapacitate. About 70 different chemicals have been used 
or stockpiled as chemical warfare agents in the 20th century. CWAs 
may be in liquid, gas or solid form. They are generally organized into 
categories according to the physiological manner in which they affect the 
human body (e.g. blood agents, blister agents, nerve agents, pulmonary 
agents).
 
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
The Chemical Weapons Convention or Convention for the Prohibition 
of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical 
Weapons and Their Destruction is an arms control agreement that aims 
prohibit the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, transfer 
or use of chemical weapons by State Parties. It came into effect in 
1993 and is administered by the Organisation for the Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons (OPCW), an independent organization based in 
the Netherlands. As of January 2014, 190 state parties have joined the 




Chloroacetophenone is a poisonous crystalline chemical used in solution 
as a tear gas, irritating the eyes.
 
Clark I
Clark I is the common name for diphenylarsinchlorid, an odourless toxic 
liquid compound once used as chemical weapon during World War I. It 
belongs to the chemicals classified as vomiting agents.  
 
Clark II
Clark II is the common name for diphenylcyanoarsine, a colourless, garlic-
smelling crystal chemical that causes nausea, vomiting and headaches. 
It was used as a chemical weapon during World War I. 
 
Ecological risk assessment (ERA)
Ecological risk assessments are conducted to evaluate the likelihood 
that adverse ecological effects could result from the exposure to one or 
more chemical or radiological contaminants in the environment. An ERA 
provides a way to develop, organize and present scientific information so 
that it is relevant to environmental decisions. 
 
Ecotoxicity
Ecotoxicity refers to the potential for biological, chemical or physical 
stressors to affect ecosystems. Ecotoxicity studies measure the effects 
of chemicals on fish, wildlife, plants and other wild organisms. 
 
HELCOM
HELCOM is The Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission 
(Helsinki Commission). It is an intergovernmental organization governing 
the Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the 
Baltic Sea Area (Helsinki Convention). HELCOM works to protect the 
marine environment of the Baltic Sea from all sources of pollution.
 
Hydrodynamic model
Hydrodynamics is the study of the motion of liquids, in particular water. 
A hydrodynamic model is a tool for describing or representing in some 
way the motion of water.
 
Inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS)
Mass spectrometry is an analytical technique that measures the ratio of 
mass-to-charge of charged particles. It is used for determining masses 
of particles, the elemental composition of a sample or molecule or the 
chemical structures of molecules. Inductively coupled plasma mass 
spectrometry is a type of mass spectrometry capable of detecting metals 
and some non-metals at concentrations as low as one part per trillion 
(one in 1012). In ICP-MS the sample is first ionized (i.e. converting the 
atom or molecule into an ion by adding or removing charged particles 
such as electrons or ions) with inductively coupled plasma. This is a 
type of plasma source in which energy is supplied by electric currents 
produced by electromagnetic induction (time-varying magnetic fields). 
A mass spectrometer is then used to separate and quantify the ions.
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Echo sounding is the technique of using sound pulses to find the depth of 
water. The interval from the emission of a pulse to reception of its echo is 
recorded, and the depth calculated from the known speed of propagation 
of sound through water. Multibeam echosounders were developed in the 
1970s to map large swaths of the ocean floor. They produce multiple 
acoustic beams across a broad swath.
 
Mustard gas
Mustard gas (named also Yperite) is the common name for sulphur gas, 
a class of chemical warfare agent with the ability to form large blisters on 
exposed skin and lungs. Sulphur mustards are colourless, viscous liquids 
with an odour resembling mustard plants or garlic, hence the name. They 
were originally developed to be produced in large scale for the Imperial 




Nerve agents are a class of phosphorus-containing organic chemicals 
that disrupt the mechanism by which nerves transfer messages to organs. 
Some nerve agents are readily vaporized or aerosolized and the primary 
portal of entry into the body is the respiratory system. Nerve agents 
can also be absorbed through the skin. They include such chemicals as 
tabun, sarin and soman. The first class of nerve agents was discovered 
in Germany in 1936 with the intent of developing insecticides. They were 
then produced as chemical weapons during World War II, though never 
used. They are now regulated under the Chemical Weapons Convention.
 
Nitrogen mustard
Nitrogen mustard is a chemical agent similar to mustard gas, also 
developed as a chemical warfare agent and stockpiled by several nations 
during World War II. It belongs to the category of blister agents. It is 
currently regulated by the Chemical Weapons Convention.
 
Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV)
A remotely operated vehicle is a tethered underwater vehicle that is 
unoccupied and operated by a person aboard a vessel. It is linked to 
the ship by a group of cables carrying electrical power, video and data 
signals back and forth between the operator and the vehicle. ROVs can 
be equipped with video cameras, lights, sonars, magnetometers, water 
samplers, thermometers and other instruments. 
 
Side Scan Sonar (SSS)
A side scan sonar is a type of sonar used to create images of large 
areas of the sea floor. Side scan sonar imagery is commonly used to 
detect debris or other items on the sea floor. The device is usually towed 
from a surface vessel and functions by emitting conical or fan-shaped 
pulses down towards the sea floor across a wide angle perpendicular to 
the path of the sensor through the water. The intensity of the acoustic 
reflections from the sea floor is recorded in a series of cross-track slices, 
which when stitched together along the direction of the motion, form an 






Tabun is a type of nerve agent. It is an extremely toxic chemical substance 
that comes in a colourless and tasteless liquid form with a fruity odour. It 
was produced industrially as a chemical weapon agent during World War 
II. Today its production is strictly controlled and stockpiling is outlawed 
by the Chemical Weapons Convention.
 
Tear gas
Tear gas, also known as lachrymatory agent or lachrymator, is a non-
lethal chemical weapon that stimulates the eyes to cause tears, pain and 
even blindness. Tear gas is commonly used as riot control and chemical 
warfare agents, though military use of tear gas is prohibited by the 
Chemical Weapons Convention.
Vessel Traffic Service (VTS)
Any service implemented by a relevant authority primarily designed 
to improve safety and efficiency of traffic flow and the protection of 
the environment. It may range from simple information messages, 
to extensive organization of the traffic involving national or regional 
schemes.
Search and Rescue (SAR)
“Search and Rescue” means the use of available resources to assist 
persons and property in potential or actual distress. Several international 
conventions address SAR at sea and the obligations of a state and of 
the master of a vessel. States which are parties to the International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS), the 1982 LOS 
Convention, or the Convention on the High Seas, 1958, are required to 
set up SAR organizations.
Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) 
Is where distress calls and all emergency notifications converge and 
missions are coordinated. Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre is 
responsible for leading the entire marine SAR mission. The centre 
provides planning, management, co-ordination, realisation and 
completion of the SAR interventions.
Joint Rescue Coordination Centre Trenton (JRCC) 
Is a rescue coordination centre responsible for coordinating the Search 
and Rescue (SAR) response to both air and marine incidents.
Harbour Master 
Is an official responsible for enforcing the regulations of a particular 
harbour or port, in order to ensure the safety of navigation, the security 




Chemical weapons (CW) were produced in mass during 
both World War (WW) I and II, but those made during 
WWII were never used in the European Theatre. At the 
end of WWII vast quantities of German chemical warfare 
agents (CWA) were stored in Wolgast on the Baltic shore.
By far the largest part of these weapons was dumped 
in the Baltic Sea and Skagerrak Strait on the orders of 
British, Russian and American occupation authorities. 
At least 170,000 tonnes of CW were dumped in the 
Skagerrak, mainly in the Norwegian trench and in the 
eastern Skagerrak, off the Swedish coast. During most 
of the dumping operations in the Skagerrak complete 
ships were sunk with their cargo. In the Baltic Sea at least 
50,000 tonnes of CW were dumped and it is assumed that 
these contained roughly 15,000 tonnes of CWA. The most 
important dumpsites here are located in the Little Belt, 
near the island of Bornholm and in the Gotland basin. In 
most cases, the CW were thrown overboard, either loose 
(bombs, shells) or in containers, but some ships were also 
sunk. In most cases those dumped materials contained 
explosives (bursters for the CW); in some cases dumping 
of conventional munitions was carried out in the same 
locations as CW. There are strong indications that some 
of the CW were thrown overboard during transport to 
the Baltic dumpsites, although how many tonnes were 
dumped in this manner is not known.
The Chemical Munitions Search & Assessment 
(CHEMSEA) Project resulted from the need to describe 
in detail CW dumpsites omitted or only partially included 
in previous investigations. CHEMSEA had the further goal 
of transforming the scientific discoveries into tools that 
can be used by maritime administrators to manage risk. 
This is inline with current European Union (EU) legislation 
concerning the chemical status of the marine environment 
and other strategic documents referring to the Baltic Sea. 
The seafloor is a resource shared by all countries 
surrounding the Baltic Sea. Its management requires 
transnational cooperation, both regarding industrial 
activity and potential environmental hazards. Use of the 
Baltic Sea floor continues to grow; many hydro-technical 
projects have already been implemented or are under 
implementation. This includes a number of submarine 
cables and offshore wind farms, a tunnel from Germany 
to Denmark and several pipelines (e.g. Nordstream, which 
stretches over 1,224 km on the Baltic bottom from Russia 
to Germany). Some of these projects are near areas at risk 
of contamination from CWA degradation products. Also, 
trawling with bottom contact gear in areas surrounding 
CWA dumps is very intensive and by-catch of CW is a 
continuing problem. 
CHEMSEA activities cover both environmental threat 
assessment and risk management issues. The latter is 
especially important for the multinational community 
of the Baltic Sea. At present, national regulations, EU 
legislation and HELCOM documents address the use 
of Baltic Sea resources and management of threats 
resulting from CWA. There is a need for introduction of 
unified, knowledge-based risk management guidelines 
and contingency strategies.
In order to address both environmental and managerial 
questions, several goals were formulated for the project:
1. Production of detailed maps of the Gotland and Gdansk 
Deep dumpsites including location of munitions and 
areas of contaminated sediments and potentially 
affected benthic fauna
2. Assessment of the toxicity of CWA degradation 
products to aquatic life based on in-situ and laboratory 
studies
3. Development of a model predicting the magnitude and 
direction of leakage events
4. Integrated assessment of ecosystem risks from CWA 
dumps
5. Development of novel, unified methodologies for CWA 
and CWA degradation product analysis to be used in all 
Baltic countries
6. Formulation of guidelines for different target groups for 
use when working with contaminated Baltic sediments
The following handbook presents the findings of the 
project, including the location of dumped chemical 
munitions, the magnitude of sediment pollution and 
possible effects on marine organisms. It also summarises 
guidelines developed for different stakeholders – direct 
users of marine resources, e.g. fishermen or submarine 
entrepreneurs, as well as maritime and environmental 
administrators. The results included here represent 
the efforts of eleven partner institutions from Finland, 
Germany, Lithuania, Poland and Sweden, assisted 
by numerous other associated institutions including 
international organisations (Helsinki Commission, 
International Dialogue for Underwater Munitions) and 
national governmental agencies (ministries of environment, 
maritime administrations of project countries and many 
others). The study was partly financed by the European 
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ChemseA fiNdiNgs ACCoRdiNg to the helsiNKi CommissioN 
(helCom) theRe ARe At leAst 50,000 toNNes 
of ChemiCAl muNitioNs dumped iN the BAltiC 
seA. these oBjeCts, RANgiNg fRom ARtilleRy 
shells ANd AiRCRAft BomBs to CoNtAiNeRs 
estimAted to hold ARouNd 15,000 toNNes of 
ChemiCAl WARfARe AgeNts (CWA). despite hAViNg 
BeeN dumped iN the fifties these oBjeCts still 
CAuse iNCideNts todAy. With iNCReAsed use of 
the BAltiC seA ANd the iNdiCAtioN of NeW ANd 
pReViously uNKNoWN AReAs of dumped ChemiCAl 
muNitioNs, theRe is A Need foR iNCReAsed 
KNoWledge ANd uNdeRstANdiNg of RisKs 
RelAted to these oBjeCts. this ChApteR Aims to 
pRoVide A BACKgRouNd oN the issue At hANd ANd 
shoW some eXAmples of RepoRted iNCideNts.
1.1. histoRy of ChemiCAl 
WeApoNs WARfARe
Chemical weapons (CW) have been used in different 
forms throughout history. One of the first indications of 
chemical weapons being used is in references to deadly 
poison made by civilizations in Babylon, Egypt, India and 
China. Writings from 1000 BC in China contain recipes 
for poisonous and harmful vapours for use in war. The 
use of poisonous weapons had low acceptance from the 
beginning and several agreements for its restriction have 
been made, including the Strasbourg Agreement of 1675, 
the Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1886 and the Haag 
Declaration 1899. Today CW are defined as “Any chemical 
which through its chemical action on life processes can 
cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm 
to humans or animals. This includes all such chemicals, 
regardless of their origin or of their method of production, 
and regardless of whether they are produced in facilities, 
in munitions or elsewhere.”1  Their use is outlawed 
since 1997 in accordance with the Chemical Weapons 
Convention.2  
Following large-scale use during World War I chemical 
weapons were banned by the Geneva Protocol (1929) 
even though production and stockpiling were allowed in 
order for states to be able to retaliate if attacked with 
CW. Although never used on the battlefield in Europe 
during World War II, extensive preparations were made 
and gases were actively used in Nazi concentration camps 
(Zyclon B), in Abyssinia by the Italians (mustard gas) as 
well as by Japan against China (mustard gas, Lewisite 
and tear gas). European states had been developing 
agents and strategies during the inter-war years. Through 
the development of pesticides in the 1930s, Germany 
discovered the potential of organophosphorous  pesticides 
as a new group of highly toxic weapons, the nerve agents. 
On the other side of the war, the allied forces were decades 
behind in the race to synthesize nerve agents. In China, 
Japanese use of CW between 1937 and 1945 caused an 
estimated 80,000 casualties. While retreating during the 
later stages of the war the Japanese forces sought to hide 
any unused weapons in fear of discovery by the Soviet 
Red Army. CW were buried on land or submerged, leaving 
no traces when the Chinese army reclaimed occupied 
territory. In the same manner, Germany dumped its nerve 
gas munitions into the Little Belt area and emptied its 
Tabun factory storage tanks into adjacent rivers prior 
to the end of the war.  Following the end of the war, as 
victors the Allied forces had to dispose of or destroy any 
remaining CW.3 
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POST - WAR MUNITION
The outcome of World War II was negotiated in Potsdam 
in 1945 by the Leader of The Soviet Union Joseph Stalin, 
President of the United States Harry Truman and Prime 
Minister of the United Kingdom Winston Churchill. Even 
though there were numerous disagreements, the three 
leaders agreed on the disarmament and demilitarisation 
of Germany. The Potsdam agreement states that “The 
complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany 
and the elimination or control of all German industry that 
could be used for military production”4 and that “All arms, 
ammunition and implements of war and all specialized 
facilities for their production shall be held at the disposal of 
the Allies or destroyed. The maintenance and production 
of all aircraft and all arms. ammunition and implements 
of war shall be prevented.”5 With Germany divided into 
four zones (American, British, French and Soviet), the 
Allied parties were responsible for taking care of any 
CW, CWA and production facilities within their area of 
oversight, either by including them in their own arsenals or 
destroying them by any means suitable. This was primarily 
done by submerging them in oceans and seas.6  
16
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1.2. dumpiNg AReAs, tRANspoRt 
Routes, AmouNts of 
dumped muNitioNs
Germany produced large stockpiles of CWA between 
1935 and 1945 and development continued afterwards. 
The CWA produced in largest volume was mustard gas 
(in different varities), accounting for around 40% of the 
total produced CWA. The majority of munitions produced 
were aircraft bombs (250 kg) and artillery shells (105 mm 
and 150 mm). Artillery shells are estimated to contain 
around 10% active CWA and an aircraft bomb around 
60%. Additionally, German forces captured large amounts 
of chemical munitions from France, Poland, the Soviet 
Union and other occupied countries. At the end of the war, 
and up until 1948, a total of 296,103 tonnes of chemical 
munitions and CWA were found on German territory.7  
*The sites of Gdansk deep and Slupsk furrow have shown indications worth following up with 
additional surveys; CHEMSEA has confirmed the presence of chemical warfare agents at these 
sites.
The areas of concern in the Baltic Sea are primarily the 
official dumpsites east of Bornholm and southeast of 
Gotland. In addition, there  is the Little Belt area as well 
as transport routes from Wolgast Harbour, were vast 
amounts of chemical munitions were located. Finally, there 
are unofficial sites of concern in the Gdansk Deep and the 
Slupsk Furrow*. At the time it was considered a cheap 
method of disposal and it was believed that the vast 
amounts of water would neutralize the CWA. In contrast 
to the dumping operations in Skagerrak and Little Belt, 
where complete ships were sunk, primarily containers and 
munitions containing CWA were dumped in the Baltic Sea. 
Dumping was primarily done, with munitions being thrown 
overboard. During the first dumping operations, objects 
still packed in wooden crates were thrown overboard 
causing some of them to drift around before finally sinking. 
It is stated that on occasions crates washed ashore on 
the Swedish coast. At the Bornholm site dumping was 
done in an area with a three nautical mile radius, initially 
with drifting or sailing vessels dispersing the dumped 
munitions. Buoys were later dropped marking the dumping 
sites to improve the accuracy but the ships conducting 
the dumping operations had only the necessary navigation 
equipment, making the exact dumping location uncertain 
in many cases. Furthermore, there are indications of 
munitions thrown overboard while en route to and from 
the designated dumping sites and that the routes taken 
differed from the designated routes in order to further 
decrease the time spent at sea. Official data suggest that 
approximately 50,000 tonnes of munitions, containing 
approximately 15,000 tonnes of CWA were dumped in the 
Baltic Sea, the majority in the Bornholm Basin.8
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Table 1: Quantities and type of munitions in tonnes (HELCOM 1994)
Types Bornholm Basin Gotland Deep Total
Aircraft bombs 7.896 682 8.578
Artillery shells 768 66 834
High-explosive bombs 314 27 341
Mines 42 4 46
Encasements 1.050 91 1.141
Smoke grenades 65 6 71
Containers 924 80 1.004
Drums 18 2 20
Total 11.077 958 12.035
Table 2: Types of Chemical Warfare Agent dumped and amount in tonnes (HELCOM 1994)
Types Bornholm Basin Gotland Deep Total
Mustard gas 7.027 608 7.635
As-cont 2.033 176 2.209
Adamsite 1.428 124 1.552
CAP 515 44 559
Others 74 6 80
Total 11.077 958 12.035
100 kg of CWA, mainly mustard gas. More than half of 
the chemical munitions dumped (in tonnes) were aircraft 
bombs containing mustard gas. Due to its chemical 
properties mustard gas is an agent that can remain stable 
on the seabed for decades after its metal encasings have 
corroded. The three different official dumping sites contain 
different types of CWA: the area of Little Belt contains 
approximately 5,000 tonnes of munitions (an estimated 
750 tonnes of warfare agent) consisting primarily of 
Tabun, a nerve gas, while the Bornholm Basin and Gotland 
Deep primarily consist of mustard gas.9 
1.3. ClAssifiCAtioN of dumped 
ChemiCAl WeApoNs iN the 
BAltiC seA
Types and amounts of dumped chemical munitions in 
the Baltic Sea vary by location. The Bornholm Basin, 
containing the largest part, holds over 90% of the chemical 
munitions dumped in the Baltic Sea. The majority of 
chemical warfare munitions dumped are aircraft bombs 
followed by encasements and containers. A typical aircraft 
bomb is the K.C. 250 (Kampfstoff Cylindrisch), 160 cm 
long, weighting 250 kg and containing approximately 
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1.4. post Cold WAR CWA 
iNCideNts iN the BAltiC seA
During the last 20 years, a total of 115 incidents involving 
submerged CWA where reported to HELCOM. Danish 
fishermen are compensated for loss of catch and other 
related costs while ships from other Baltic Sea states 
are not. Due to this discrepancy in the systems of 
compensation, the reported cases primarily originate from 
Danish fishermen through Danish authorities. Although 
the number of reported incidents has declined during the 
last decade, incidents are still occurring with potentially 
serious outcomes. With an increased use of the Baltic Sea, 
including the construction of wind farms and pipelines, the 
risks remain high. The following cases described below 
exemplifies incidents involving fishermen and CWA.
Table 3: Numbers of reported incidents where chemical 
munitions have been caught by fishermen (HELCOM)
Year Numbers  of incidents  
Weight of  




















2012 1 45 † Denmark is the only Baltic Sea state compensating its fishermen for destruction of potentially 
contaminated.
Katrine Søe 
In 2011, the crew of the Katrine Søe had been 
fishing for five weeks, during which time they 
caught, among other things, an object containing 
mustard gas. The crew chucked the object 
together with other pieces of junk caught during 
the cruise. Back at the harbour, the crew spent 
three weeks making repairs with the hazardous 
object and other pieces of junk still located 
onboard. When done with the repairs the crew 
prepared to take to sea. They  discarded the junk 
on the quay before setting sail. The following day 
one of the harbour staff members identified signs 
and symptoms of contact with mustard gas and 
alerted authorities. The grenade was found among 
the pieces of junk and the ship was ordered back 
to harbour due to the risk of further contamination 
and to ensure that neither the captain nor his crew 
had been exposed to the chemical agent. The 
object was disposed of by authorities.10  
Since we were to sail on Wednesday, we threw 
all the junk that we had caught in the nets on the 
quay, where all the others had put theirs.11
WŁA 206
In January 1997, the crew of the Polish fishing 
vessel WŁA 206, trawling 30 nautical miles north 
of Władysławowo harbour, extracted an est. 
5-7 kg clay-like object that proved to be a  lump 
of mustard gas. The lump where dumped in a 
port rubbish container before anyone identified 
symptoms of exposure. The next day, all of 
the crewmembers experienced “adverse skin 
reactions, a sort of burning sensation, skin lesions 
and reddening.”12 The lump resulted in serious 
burns and injuries for the eight crewmembers. Four 
where treated, and released home, while the other 
four hospitalised due to severe skin burns before 
finally being released home after a few weeks. 
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The lump of mustard gas where taken care of by 
the Military Decontamination Unit in the Polish 
Navy. Deaths were avoided only thanks to the low, 
January temperatures, which stopped gas from 
evaporation. 13
SG Delfin
In 2001, the Swedish trawler SG Delfin caught 
an aircraft bomb, later confirmed to contain 
mustard gas. Believing it would be easier for 
authorities to handle, the crew transported the 
bomb into Nogersund port and late in the evening 
placed it on the quay before finally informing the 
Swedish Coastguard. The Coastguard relayed the 
information forward to local emergency services 
that assumed responsibility. During the following 
day, several governmental agencies were involved 
in confirmation and the process of handling the 
incident. Finally, confirmed as an aircraft bomb 
containing mustard gas, authorities evacuated 
several houses and around 100 people had to 
leave their homes. After authorities disarmed the 
bomb, they neutralized the chemical warfare agent 
using decontaminants supplied by the Swedish 
Armed Forces. The management of the incident 
took around two days.14 
Hildarstindür
Although the incident with Hildarstindür took place 
in 1984, it shows the potential severity of incidents 
related to submerged chemical munitions. Trawling 
southeast of Gotland, seven fishermen on board 
a Faroese trawler unknowingly brought mustard 
gas onboard their vessel. During the night, the 
crew caught an object while trawling. Due to the 
time of day they did not identify it as unknown and 
dangerous to the crewmen and mustard gas was 
present not only on the ship deck but also inside 
the cabins. The crew suffered severe injuries and 
when they finally receive aid from authorities, they 
required medical evacuation to Copenhagen.15 
1.5. CWA ReleVANt 
CoNVeNtioNs/tReAties ANd 
oRgANisAtioNs
The Chemical Weapons Convention on the Prohibition 
of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of 
Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, commonly 
referred to as the Chemical Weapons Convention, entered 
into force on April 29, 1997. It is one of the world’s most 
widely accepted conventions, ratified by 190 states parties 
and lacking the participation of only six states. It aims 
to resolve the issue of CW stockpiles and ensure their 
destruction. The implementing body of the convention is 
the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
(OPCW) seated in The Hague. Parties of the convention 
are obliged to declare any CW in their possession and, 
under the supervision of OPCW, ensure its destruction as 
well as the destruction of any production facilities. State 
parties are prohibited from using chemical weapons or any 
military preparation to use them. Additionally, states are 
responsible for any CW they have abandoned on another 
state’s territory. This, however, only applies to chemical 
weapons abandoned on land since 1977 or dumped at 
sea since January 1, 1985. Originally, the convention 
aimed for the complete destruction of CW ten years after 
it entered into force. This deadline included a one-time 
possibility of extension for a period of an additional five 
years, i.e. 2012. As of September 2013, OPCW declared 
that 81.10% of the world’s chemical weapon stockpiles 
had been destroyed. During the Third Review Conference 
of the Chemical Weapons Convention in spring 2013, 
the conference declared its determination to destroy all 
existing chemical weapons in the shortest time possible. 
Although CW and their use are banned in a large part 
of the world, there are still confirmed incidents taking 
place, but progress is also being made. In 2013 a UN 
investigation team confirmed use of the nerve agent 
Sarin in Syria. In June and October, 2013, Somalia and 
Syria joined the Chemical Weapons Convention as the 
189th and 190th state parties. On October 11, 2013, the 
Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded the Nobel Peace 
Prize to the OPCW for “its extensive efforts to eliminate 
chemical weapons”.16 
‡ Israel and Myanmar have not yet (mid 2013) ratified the convention. Angola, Egypt, North 
Korea, South Sudan have neither signed nor acceded the convention.
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The Helsinki Commission (HELCOM), is an 
intergovernmental cooperation between the European 
Community and the states of Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Russia and Sweden. 
HELCOM works to protect the marine environment from 
all sources of pollution. Within HELCOM there are six 
working groups with the Monitor and Assessment Group 
(MONAS) and the Response Group (RESPONSE) which 
concern the issue of submerged chemical munitions.
1.6. summARy
Following the large-scale use of chemical weapons during 
World War I, extensive preparations were made to further 
develop chemical warfare and increase its capacity. Even 
though it was never used on the European battlefield, 
large amounts of CW remained after the end of the 
war. The victors decided that they were responsible for 
the disposal any chemical munitions found in their area 
of oversight. In addition to being a cheap method of 
disposal, the belief was that the vast amounts of waters 
in the oceans would neutralize and absorb the dangerous 
1  Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and 
Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction Article 1(b)
2  Martha K. Lenhart (ed.) 2008 . Medical aspects of chemical warfare, Ch.2 
History of Chemical Warfare
3  Martha K. Lenhart (ed.) 2008 . Medical aspects of chemical warfare, Ch.2 
History of Chemical Warfare; Deng, Hongmei, and Peter O’Meara Evans. 
“Social and environmental aspects of abandoned chemical weapons in China.” 
The Nonproliferation Review 4.3 (1997): 101-108.
4  Agreement following the Postdam Conference  Article 2: A3i
5  Agreement following the Postdam Conference  Article 2: A3i(b)
6  The Berlin (Potsdam) Conference, July 17-August 2, 1945 (a) Protocol of the 
Proceedings, August l, 1945
7  Martha K. Lenhart (ed.) 2008. Medical aspects of chemical warfare, Ch.2 
History of Chemical Warfare; HELCOM CHEMU, 1994. Report on Chemical 
Munitions Dumped in the Baltic Sea. Report to the 16th Meeting of Helsinki 
Commission from the ad hoc Working Group on Dumped Chemical Munitions
8  HELCOM CHEMU, 2013. Report on Chemical Munitions Dumped in the  
Baltic Sea. Report of the ad hoc Expert Group to Update and Review the 
Existing Information on Dumped Chemical Munitions in the Baltic Sea 
(HELCOM MUNI)
9  HELCOM CHEMU, 1994. Report on Chemical Munitions Dumped in the Baltic 
Sea. Report to the 16th Meeting of Helsinki Commission from the ad hoc 
Working Group on Dumped Chemical Munitions; Helcom Response Manual 
2002, Volume 2, chapter 6. 
10  Nordjyske Medier - Fisker tvunget i havn af granat [Fishermen forced to harbor 
due to grenade], (accessed 2013-05-24) <http://nordjyske.dk/nyheder/fisker-
tvunget-i-havn-af-granat/520362e0-0bc5-43c1-bc20-6a6bfa762782/4/1513>; 
Dagbladet Politiken - Mand i Thyborøn skadet af sennepsgas [Man in Thyborøn 
injured by mustard gas] (accessed 2013-05-24) <http://politiken.dk/indland/
ECE1227427/mand-i-thyboroen-skadet-af-sennepsgas/>; TV MIDTVEST  
- Her er granaten [Here is the grenade], (accessed 2013-05-24)  
<http://www.tvmidtvest.dk/indhold/her-er-granaten>
substances. The Soviet Union dumped at least 50,000 
tonnes of chemical munitions containing an estimated 
15,000 tonnes of CWA in the Baltic Sea, primarily in the 
Bornholm Basin. Other official dumping sites are the Little 
Belt area and the Gotland Deep. In addition to these sites, 
dumping took place en route from Wolgast, where vast 
amounts of chemical munitions were located. Furthermore, 
CHEMSEA has found indications pointing to the unofficial 
dumping sites of Slupsk Furrow and the Gdansk Deep.
Due to discrepancies in the systems of compensation for 
fishermen involved in incidents with submerged chemical 
munitions, only statistics from Denmark are deemed 
valid. During the last ten years (2003 – 2012), there 
were 44 reported incidents. Even thought the incidents 
are declining in numbers, the problem remains; there are 
dangerous objects in the Baltic Sea inside and outside 
known locations. Activities undertaken on the seabed 
of the Baltic Sea need to acknowledge the presence 
of chemical munitions and the potential dangers they 
constitute. Additionally, there are environmental factors 
that need to be taken into account as the CWA remain on 
the seabed far longer than originally believed.
11 Nordjyske Medier - Fisker tvunget i havn af granat [Fishermen forced to 
harbor due to grande], (accessed 2013-05-24) Available at <http://nordjyske.
dk/nyheder/fisker-tvunget-i-havn-af-granat/520362e0-0bc5-43c1-bc20-
6a6bfa762782/4/1513>
12 Gonenc, I. Ethem., Ambrose, Robert B., Koutitonsky, Vladimir G., Rashleigh, 
Brenda. & Wolflin, John P., Assessment of the Fate and Effects of Toxic Agents 
on Water Resources [electronic resource], Springer, Dordrecht, 2007, p. 313.
13 Gonenc, I. Ethem., Ambrose, Robert B., Koutitonsky, Vladimir G., Rashleigh, 
Brenda. & Wolflin, John P., Assessment of the Fate and Effects of Toxic Agents 
on Water Resources [electronic resource], Springer, Dordrecht, 2007.
14 Waleij, Annica. “Dumpade C-stridsmedel i Skagerrak och Östersjön, en 
uppdatering.” [Dumped chemical warfare agents in skagerrak and the Baltic 
Sea, an update.] Totalförsvarets Forskningsinstitut (2001).
15 Waleij, Annica. “Dumpade C-stridsmedel i Skagerrak och Östersjön, en 
uppdatering.” [Dumped chemical warfare agents in Skagerrak and the Baltic 
Sea, an update.] Totalförsvarets Forskningsinstitut (2001); FOI, Faktasamling 
CBRN - Kemiska stridsmedel, beskrivningar [Collection of facts CBRN – 
Chemical weapons, descriptions] 
16 The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, (accessed 2013-
09-21) <http://www.opcw.org/>; United Nations Mission to Investigate 
Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, 
“Report on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in the Ghouta Area of 
Damascus on 21 August 2013” Available at http://reliefweb.int/sites/
reliefweb.int/files/resources/Secretary_General_Report_of_CW_Investigation.
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2.1. hydRoACoustiC CWA 
deteCtioN methods 
The Polish Naval Academy (PNA) and the Swedish 
Maritime Administration (SMA) conducted several 
research cruises on board the vessels Baltica and Oceania 
to detect and verify CWA in the Gdansk and Gotland 
Deep areas. 
In a first step, the size of containers used to store chemical 
munitions was defined – based on the analysis of historical 
documents – as 150 mm artillery shells and steel barrels. 
Multibeam echosounder (MBS) and towed side scan sonar 
(SSS) were used in order to reveal the potential location 
of bottom objects that may be recognised as chemical 













SMALL BOTTOM OBJECT (SBO)
The research area of the official dumping site in Gotland 
Deep, with a total surface of 1,760 km2, was divided into 
40 sub-areas each with a size approximately 13,000 x 
3,000-5,000 m. 
The study of the official chemical munitions dumping 
area within the Gotland Deep revealed that this region 
is characterised by the presence of a large quantity of 
discarded waste material. In some areas, chains of sea 
mines measuring tens of nautical miles were recognised 
and their position catalogued. On the basis of the collected 
SSS images a preliminary classification and an estimate 
of local densities and clusters of small bottom targets was 
performed along with their mapping.
Targets with features characteristic for mine-like objects, 
classified on the SSS images as potential munitions 
LARGE BOTTOM OBJECT (LBO)
GOTLAND DEEP DUMPING SITE’S DIVISION DISTRIBUTION OF DETECTED OBJECTS
required visual checking. 198 objects were investigated 
through ROV operations (the total number of ROV 
dives by SMA and PNA was over 250). ROV operations 
including video recognition and water and sediment 
sampling resulted in an authentication and classification 
rate exceeding 50%, thus proving that SSS checks of the 
sea bottom at relatively high ship speeds are sufficiently 
detailed, while remaining more time and cost effective 
than other methods of detection.
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the deep processing of recorded raw data and may in 
certain situations lead to errors due to the formation of 
‘nodes’, where the sum of the errors contributes to form 
‘false’ objects. However, the places where the positive 
dipoles are shown next to the negative dipoles may be 
considered as highly reliable.
Due to the low mass of searched objects the signal 
recorded by the measuring device was deliberately 
amplified in order to enhance local anomalies. The values 
shown in the diagrams are higher than the actual values. 
However, this method allows locating the places of slightly 
increased values in the magnetic field of the area.
2.2. mAgNetometRiC suRVey
The main aim of the magnetometric survey, conducted in a 
small test area of Gdansk Deep, by the Maritime Institute 
in Gdansk, was to find correlations between geographical 
positions of objects identified on the seabed during the 
hydroacoustic survey and the positions of Earth magnetic 
field disturbances.
A number of magnetic anomalies were detected in the area 
of research, plus one more outside the region designated 
by PNA, indicating the presence of ferromagnetic objects.
Not all the objects pointed by PNA gave magnetic 
anomalies response. It is probable that the objects 
detected with the SSS are objects with no magnetic 
properties, such as shipwrecks (or parts of wrecks) made 
of wood. There is also a significant probability that some of 
the identified anomalies do not indicate the actual place of 
ferromagnetic object deposition. The applied processing 
technique used to find small magnetic anomalies involves 
Reference: Report of the magnetometric survey in the area of the Deep of 
Gdansk, Report of the magnetometric survey in the area of the Deep of Gdansk 
2012-05-15, Version: 1.01, Agnieszka Brzezińska, Dorota Cichowska, Łukasz 
Gajewski, Wojciech Konieczny, Maria Kubacka, Jarosław Nowak
RESEARCH VESSEL OF THE MARITIME INSTITUTE IN GDANSK – 
R/V „IMOR”
ANOMALY AM-02
SEAQUEST MAGNETOMETER AND SIDE SCAN SONAR
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vessel-mounted current profiler datasets originating from 
38 regular cruises of the research vessels R/V Oceania 
and R/V Baltica in 2001-2012 organised by IO PAN and 
the Polish National Marine Fisheries Research Institute 
(NMFRI). 
So far, mean circulation and current speed in the three 
CWA dumpsites were mainly predicted by numerical 
models. Now, for the first time, relatively long (several 
months) in-situ observations of near-bottom currents 
can be presented. This makes the results from the 
bottom current measurements within the CHEMSEA 
project unique. Generally, the observations show that 
the currents’ speed across the Baltic proper was around 
12 cm/s in the whole water column, with a stronger flow 
in the regions above the sills in the Bornholm and Slupsk 
Channels, reaching on average of about 20 cm/s except 
in the lowest layer (8-20 m from the sea bed) where the 
speed reached a maximum of 35 cm/s. These figures 
suggest that the investigated regions are important areas 
of intense vertical mixing. The results also show that 
current velocities and directions in the three basins are 
highly variable. 
2.3. Bottom CuRReNts, 
sedimeNt Re-suspeNsioN 
ANd tRANspoRt
The detection and classification of dumped CW is the 
first step in assessing the risk for the marine environment 
and coastal communities. In addition, it is necessary to 
improve the knowledge regarding what happens when 
chemical agents actually start to leak from corroded 
munitions or are re-suspended with sediments in the 
water column. Understanding when near-bottom currents 
exceed the critical friction velocity that causes the re-
suspension of a contaminated sediment type and which 
direction these contaminants may then drift is essential 
for the classification of CWA dumpsites, risk assessment 
and effective counter measures in case of leakage.
Against this backdrop, IO PAN set out to investigate and 
characterise dense currents in the project’s CWA dumping 
sites in the Baltic proper: Bornholm Basin, Gdansk Basin 
and Slupsk Furrow. During the summer of 2012 IO PAN 
deployed three moorings to measure current velocity 
profiles in the Slupsk Furrow and the Gdansk Basin, 
where additionally temperature, salinity, oxygen and 
turbidity were measured at about 1 m above the bottom. 
The mooring results were combined with two long-term 
Route of the R/V Oceania
G d a n s k  B a s i n
S l u p s k  Fu r r o w
B o r n h o l m  B a s i n
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Figure 1: Distribution of near-bottom currents with marked chemical munition deposit areas (boxes) 
as well as the pathway of dense waters from the Danish Straits (arrows). The current measurements 
were made for the central Bornholm Basin (below the halocline depth), northern Slupsk Furrow (M2, 
at 1m above the bottom) and western Gdansk Deep (M1, at 1m above the bottom).
They are mainly determined by four factors: the impact 
of atmosphere-ice-water, water exchange through the 
Danish Straits, river supply and topography. The near-
bottom currents information were taken from the moorings 
deployed one meter above the sea bed on the pathway 
of the inflow waters.  Those dense waters accumulate on 
the area northeast of the island of Bornholm, above the 
primary chemical dump site. The average currents at this 
site are shown in Figure 1. The average currents direction 
were very variable but over 30% of them were northern 
with ±45 degree spread. During the whole deployment 
period low current speed were observed (ca 7 cm/s).   
 The Slupsk Furrow (SF) has bi-directional flow, northern 
part of the furrow is westerly directed, southern part is 
easterly directed. At the M2 in SF, with a narrow spread 
over 80% currents were south-westerly directed. Relatively 
strong currents speed exceeding 15 cm/s occurred during 
17 % of time (10 days). During the deployment time, very 
weak northern and eastern currents were measured with 
a speed up to 5 cm/s. 
From SF through Hoburg Channel, inflow waters are 
transported to the deeper parts of the Baltic Sea. However, 
part of the inflow waters are transported to the Gdansk 
Deep (GD). This basin act as a buffer in which part of the 
water, circulates. At M1 located in GD dump site region, 
flow was directed easterly or westerly for almost 60% of 
the time (90 days). However, westerly currents speed 
were slightly greater. Strong currents that exceeded 10 
cm/s occurred relatively briefly.  Northern and Southern 
currents were weak, speed ca 8 cm/s. 
The bottom mixed layer occupies at least 10% of the water 
column and the turbulent mixing induced by near-bottom 
currents is likely to produce local sediment resuspension 
and transport in all three sub-basins. The near-bottom 
currents exceeding critical friction velocity for a given 
sediment type cause resuspension of sediments into the 
upper water column and their transport with the flow, or a 
bed load transport of coarser sediments. Sediments can 
be transported from BB through Slupsk Sill  to deeper 
parts of the Baltic Sea and partly to the GD. However, 
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Reference: Bulczak A. I., Rak D., Schmidt B. (forthcoming): Observations of near-
bottom currents in three deep sub-basins of the Baltic Proper: Bornholm Basin, 
Slupsk Furrow and Gdansk Deep.
objects in the area. In order to select bottom objects for 
further detailed investigation with ROV1, it was necessary 
to categorise them.
The primary target categorisation into five classes was 
based on the size of highlights of detected objects and 
their acoustic shadows. Typically acceptable size and 
shape for Class 1 objects – the most probable munition 
pieces – are within dimensions of 1.8 x 0.5 m. Class 2 
contains targets with strong echo and clearly visible pit/
shadow but that are the wrong size – in general too big 
to be recognised as munition pieces. Hardly recognisable 
targets (most likely sunken in the mud or covered with fine 
sands) characterised by strong hydroacoustic reflection 
but without the pit/shadow encompass Class 3 objects. 
Finally, any detected wrecks were classified as Class 4 
and other unrecognised targets as ‘Class 5’.
2.4. mAppiNg
The Polish Naval Academy designed a geospatial database 
based on ArcGIS Geographic Information System 
developed by ESRI to store all the measurement data 
obtained during the course of the CHEMSEA project. This 
includes, in the first step, the bathymetric data obtained 
with the Multibeam Echosounder (MBES) by the research 
vessels R/V Baltica and R/V Oceania, along with the sea 
bottom mosaic picture composed of sonograms collected 
by towed SSS. Subsequently, the database was also 
filled with oceanographic and biochemical data reflecting 
results of laboratory analyses of sediment samples and 
studies of biota tissues.
The vast amount of GIS data refers to hydrographic survey 
conducted at the official Gotland Deep dumping ground, 
located in the south-easternmost Swedish EEZ border to 
Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. Altogether, MBES and SSS 
measurements revealed the presence of 39,260 bottom 
Table 1. The number of targets catalogued into classes
Class Number
1 Probable munition 17.267
2 Other strong echoes 6.476
3 Unrecognizable, in sediments or flat objects 12.476
4 Wrecks 33
5 Other echoes 3.008
Total 39.260
1 Remotely Operated Vehicle
the probability of long-term transport of BB originated 
WOCMD (waste originating from chemical munitions 
dumpsites) to GD is low, they might still reach the area via 
subsequent deposition/resuspension cycles as observed 
in other areas of the Baltic. Gdansk Deep can act both 
as a transport and source area. Sediments originated in 
Gotland Deep can be transported to the northern part of 
the Baltic Sea. During the year, transport of sediments 
from the WOCMD to the shallow areas can occur in 10% 
of time. More complex approach needs simulations made 
by the numerical models.
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Classification of targets was based on analysis of 
sonograms done by experts of the Swedish Maritime 
Administration and Swedish Navy, Mine Warfare Data 
Center (MWDC) and supported with artificial intelligence 
tools, such as the neural networks used by IO PAN experts 
to analyse both sonograms and raw recordings of SSS 
signals.
In order to verify the correctness of target classification, 
selected Class 1 objects were verified visually during 
underwater ROV operations. Figure 2 depicts the positions 
of ROV operations conducted by scientists of PNA and 
SMA in the framework of the CHEMSEA project.
Although the main effort of ROV operations was focused 
on the Gotland Deep area, ROV operations were also 
conducted in Bornholm Deep and Gdansk Deep in order 
to correlate the results of the CHEMSEA project with 
the earlier, EU-financed MERCW research programme, 
which focused only on Bornholm Deep, and to verify the 
hypothesis of CWA dumping in Gdansk Deep.
FIG. 1. DISTRIBUTION OF BOTTOM OBJECTS IN THE AREA OF GOTLAND DEEP
The distribution of bottom objects detected in the Gotland 
Deep with classification results is depicted in Figure 1.
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FIG. 2. POSITIONS OF ROV UNDERWATER OPERATIONS CONDUCTED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF CHEMSEA PROJECT
It was not possible in every single case to visually confirm 
the presence of objects detected by SSS on the sea 
bottom. Moreover, in a few cases, visual inspection of 
underwater objects revealed that the automatic or semi-
automatic classification of targets was incorrect. 
ROV INSPECTION ON MISSCLASSIFIED OBJECT
ROV INSPECTION ON CORRECTLY CLASSIFIED OBJECT
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Figure 3 depicts ROV operations conducted by SMA 
in Gotland Deep, showing the correctness of target 
classification. Targets classified primarily as Class 1 and 
visually confirmed as Class 1 are depicted as green dots. 
Targets visually confirmed to be classes other than Class 
1, i.e. misclassified, are depicted as red dots. Yellow dots 
represent cases in which the ROV was not able to visually 
confirm the presence of a target on the sea bottom or in 
which the physical state of the detected target did not 
allow classification to any given class.
The ROV mission was not only to confirm the correctness 
of target classification and document targets by means of 
video and photo techniques, but also to collect samples of 
sediments in the direct vicinity of the underwater objects 
for further chemical laboratory tests.
In addition to the ROV, sediment samples were also 
taken with other sampling tools (i.e. Box corer and Van 
Veen grab sampler). The positions of sediment samples 
obtained with the aforementioned tools are depicted with 
red dots in Figures 4 and 5.
Additionally, the positions of fish sampling stations 
(described in Chapter 3) are depicted with green dots.
FIG. 3. CORRECTNESS OF ‘CLASS 1’ TARGETS’ CLASSIFICATION
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FIG. 4. POSITIONS OF SEDIMENTS SAMPLING AND FISH SAMPLING STATIONS
FIG. 5. POSITIONS OF SEDIMENTS SAMPLING AND FISH SAMPLING STATIONS – GOTLAND DEEP DUMPING SITE
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FIG. 6. CONCENTRATION LEVELS OF TOTAL ARSENIC IN SEDIMENTS
After receiving the results of the laboratory analyses 
of sediment samples, the GIS database was enhanced 
with data on the concentration levels of multiple 
chemicals, allowing for correlation of sampling positions 
with contamination levels. General classification 
of contaminants into two groups of arsenic-related 
substances and CWA allowed to draw a map of 
contaminant concentration levels and positive detections 
of CWA and their degradation products.
Figures 6 to 9 depict the concentration levels of total arsenic 
in sediments and the positions of positive detections of 
CWA and their degradation products, respectively.
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FIG. 7. CONCENTRATION LEVELS OF TOTAL ARSENIC IN SEDIMENTS – GOTLAND DEEP DUMPING SITE




The rapid growth of the offshore industry raises new issues 
related to munitions (both conventional and chemical) 
dumped at sea. The use of the seabed for offshore 
activities such as resource extraction or construction 
is rapidly developing and increases the likelihood of 
encounters with dumped munitions.
Many temporary or permanent facilities will be deployed 
on the seafloor in the near future, resulting in increased risk 
of coming into contact with CWA. Operations conducted 
directly on or in the sediment layer may damage the 
encasements of chemical munitions that have not yet 
lost their integrity, generating threats to humans and the 
environment.
Therefore, prior to any offshore operation, appropriate 
methodologies for risk assessment must be followed. The 
model approach has been introduced during the biggest 
investment in recent years in the Baltic Sea area, i.e. 
the Nord Stream pipeline construction. The documented 
experiences of the Nord Stream pipeline laying project 
between 2005 and 2011 could be a model for future 
project plans.
FIG. 9. POSITIONS OF POSITIVE DETECTIONS OF CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS AND THEIR DEGRADATION PRODUCTS 
– GOTLAND DEEP DUMPING SITE
NORD STREAM
Planning
The proposed route, including the 15 m wide 
installation corridor, was planned in such a way 
as to avoid known dumpsites, based on available 
historical and scientific data.
Area Wide Assessment
The screening survey included a 2 km zone 
around the actual activities, followed by a detailed 
geophysical survey of a 180 m zone along the 
final planned pipeline route and inspections of 
the close vicinity (a 20 m zone) with a resolution 
high enough to identify objects of sizes >10 
cm. Employed technologies included multi-beam 
echo sounders (MBES), high-resolution side-
scan sonars (SSS), sub-bottom profilers and 
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a magnetometer. MBES and SSS provided a 
detailed picture of the contours of the sea floor 
and of objects lying on the seabed. The sub-
bottom profiler penetrated deep into the material 
at the sea bottom to show a cross-section of the 
mud, silt and bedrock that make up the seabed. 
The magnetometer provided information on ferrous 
(iron-based) materials.
Detailed Survey
The second stage used a 6.7 m wide 12 sensor 
gradiometer array mounted on a ROV to 
detect any ferrous metals on the seabed and 
provided coverage of the full installation corridor. 
Concurrently with the gradiometer survey, visual 
coverage of the seabed was also achieved. The 
gradiometer data was processed within a digital 
terrain model to allow objects to be located for 
further visual inspection.
Inspection
In a third stage, Nord Stream visually inspected 
the targets located during the previous two stages. 
This allowed experts to examine and identify any 
questionable objects.
Monitoring
Pre- and post- lay monitoring was performed in 
the vicinity of five discovered CW objects. This 
included both visual inspection and analysis of 
CWA degradation products in sediments. Baseline 
levels were established prior to pipe laying. With 
the monitoring programme, Nord Stream was 
aiming at documenting any changes in the level 
of CWA in the sediment due to project activities 
resulting in the disturbance of contaminated 
sediments originating from dumped chemical 
munitions. Sampling was conducted at 29 stations 
along the midline of the pipelines. At six of these 
stations, a transect consisting of 15 stations was 
sampled. Three sampling campaigns – baseline 
and after installation of the first and the second 
pipelines were performed. Samples were analysed 
in two certified laboratories.
In order to facilitate Area Wide Assessment and Detailed 
Survey phases within the model methodology, CHEMSEA 
worked out a framework of detection, classification and 
mapping of CWA, which consisted of:
• Desktop research of historical documents and munitions 
examples in order to define sizes and shapes of the 
objects searched for
• Hydroacoustic detection with multiple survey tools
• Magnetometric detection
• ROV / visual confirmation
• Post-processing of data into a geospatial database and 
mapping
Based on CHEMSEA research, a hydroacoustic survey 
would be advised as the first step in both environmental 
impact assessment and work site selection in the area 
where suspected dumped munitions are located. It is 
advisable to perform a sonar survey using side scan sonars, 
multi beam echosounders and sub-bottom profilers. To 
exclude natural or non-munition objects, the sonar survey 
should be complimented with other techniques, such as 
magnetometry used for detecting ferrous items.
The aforementioned survey techniques generate 
enormous amounts of data, which needs to be fused and 
processed using GIS computer software, widely available 
on the commercial market. The resulting output represents 
an enhanced graphic display of the surveyed area in the 
form of detailed charts aimed to support decision-making 
processes in the area of human maritime activities.
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effeCts of CWA 
leAKAge oN BiotA  
ANd sedimeNts  
At dumpiNg sites
• Effects of CWA on biota at dumping sites
• CWA in sediments
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Fish samples Blue mussel 
samples
ChemseA fiNdiNgs
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT APPROACH 
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oCeAN WAteRs ARe iN A CoNstANt fluX, mAKiNg 
the study of effeCts of CWA oN fish, plANts 
ANd otheR mARiNe BiotA A ChAlleNgiNg tAsK. 
seVeRAl AppRoAChes WeRe used to eVAluAte the 
eNViRoNmeNtAl stRess geNeRAted By CWA iN 
sedimeNts ANd the WAteR ColumN. they iNCluded 
the study of iNfAuNA CommuNities As Well 
As the heAlth effeCts oN Cod ANd mussels. 
huNdReds of sedimeNt, WAteR ANd tissue 
sAmples WeRe ColleCted ANd suBseQueNtly 
ANAlysed iN the lABoRAtoRy.
3.1. effeCts of CWA oN BiotA At 
dumpiNg sites
3.1.1. Macro- and Meiofauna
Benthic organisms, i.e. those living in the bottom 
substratum of a body of water, especially in the bottom-
most oceanic sediments are called macro- and meiofauna. 
Meiofauna are small benthic invertebrates that live in both 
marine and freshwater environments passing unharmed 
through a 0.5 – 1 mm mesh but retained by a 30 – 45 µm 
mesh. Mesofauna are macroscopic sediment invertebrates 
such as arthropods or nematodes. Organisms belonging 
to macro- as well as meiofauna are widely used benthic 
ecological indicators for monitoring the health of an 
environment or ecosystem. 
In the CHEMSEA project three sampling sites were 
selected to investigate the macro- and meiofauna 
commmunities: Bornholm Deep, Gotland Deep and 
Gdansk Deep. Fauna collected from these locations 
was compared with fauna from a reference area located 
between the study regions in an area of similar depth, 
i.e. deeper than 80 m. In total six scientific cruises were 
conducted in different seasons between 2011 and 2013. 
During the first, second and third expeditions macrofauna 
was collected using box-core and Van-Veen grab sampling 
equipment. Sub-samples for meiofauna were collected 
using a plexiglass core with a 10 cm2 surface grip. During 
subsequent cruises a remote operating underwater 
vehicle (ROV) equipped with a sampling device for faunal 
material was used. This offered the opportunity to collect 
samples in the immediate vicinity of buried objects that 
may be a potential source of chemical pollution. 
The first results show that macrofaunal and meiofaunal 
communities in CW dumping sites are very poor in terms 
of abundance and number of taxa in comparison with the 
reference area. A complete lack of any representatives 
of macrozoobenthos in all investigated dumping sites was 
noted. The Baltic deeps are inhabited only by nematodes, 
mostly in very low densities. Therefore nematodes 
were used as a key species to explore the meiobenthic 
communities inhabiting chemical dumping sites in the 
Baltic deeps. 
In total 48 genera of nematodes belonging to 21 families 
were noted in all investigated areas. The most frequently 
occurring were nematodes belonging to the genus 
Sabatieria and Terschellingia. The dominating species 
were Tripyloides marinus and Terschellingia longicaudata. 
A first Baltic Sea record of viviparous nematodes 
(Halomonhystera) was observed. All listed species are 
resistant to low oxygen concentrations in the external 
environment. The direct effects of CWA on benthic faunal 
communities, however, are difficult to determine due to 
hypoxic or even anoxic conditions. Although the lack of 
oxygen near the bottom at sampling sites located below 
80-100 m depth is probably the main factor in determining 
the occurrence of living organisms, in combination with 
this, the low nematode density and diversity at dumping 
sites can also be regarded as the consequence of the 
higher toxicity levels in the sediments.
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3.1.2. Cod (Gadus morhua L.) 
Cod is the most abundant gadoid species in the Baltic 
Sea and with landings of around 70.000 t/year it is of 
major economic importance. Given its value as a fishery 
resource, the ecology and stock structure of cod have been 
thoroughly studied and changes in stock performance are 
assessed regularly by all countries around the Baltic Sea 
involved in cod fishing. In addition to stock assessment 
surveys, some countries have been monitoring the 
health status of cod since the 1980s, mainly as part of 
national environmental monitoring programmes. From 
these studies, long-term health data are available that 
have previously been used for the analysis of spatial and 
temporal patterns in disease occurrence. These data are 
therefore of major relevance for the CHEMSEA project 
as reference information. Besides being a well-studied 
fish species, cod was selected for the CHEMSEA project 
as target species primarily because it is a demersal 
and bentho-pelagic species and thus is at risk of being 
in direct contact with dumped CWA. Furthermore, it is 
widely distributed in the Baltic Sea and also inhabits areas 
HALOMONHYSTERA SPP. COLLECTED DURING CHEMSEA 
PROJECT IN THE AREA OF GOTLAND DEEP. ©IO PAN
Reference: Kotwicki, Lech; Grzelak, Katarzyna (2013): Summary of adverse 
ecological effects to infauna. CHEMSEA Report.
with dumped CW. Actually, some of its major spawning 
grounds are located in the deep basins at Bornholm and 
Gotland, the main CW dumping areas after World War II. 
For the CHEMSEA project, the Thünen Institute of 
Fisheries Ecology (FI), the Alfred Wegener Institute 
Helmholtz Centre for Polar and Marine Research (AWI), 
the Finnish Environment Institute (SYKE) and the Nature 
Research Centre (NRC) assessed the health status 
of cod at CW dumpsites and in reference areas in the 
Baltic Sea. Sampling took place during four campaigns 
between December 2011 and September 2013 onboard 
the fishery research vessel Walther Herwig III. Cod was 
sampled by means of pelagic (at the dumpsites) and 
bottom trawling (at the reference sites), covering official 
and suspected dumpsites (Bornholm, Gotland, Belt Sea, 
Gdansk Deep) as well as a number of reference sites in 
the western (Arkona Sea) and eastern Baltic Sea (outside 
the Gulf of Gdansk). In addition to studies on grossly 
visible external and internal diseases and parasites and 
biometric characteristics carried out directly onboard 
the vessel, a large number of tissue samples were taken 
for subsequent analyses of contaminant concentrations 
as well as for the analysis of biochemical, physiological, 
pathological, neurotoxic and genotoxic responses to CWA 
exposure (see Table 1). 
Summarising the results of these analyses and of all 
campaigns, the data reveal no significant overall health 
effects in cod from CW dumpsites compared to the reference 
areas. However, when looking at single parameters some 
differences were noted, possibly reflecting responses to 
CWA exposure. As an example, tissue samples of the 
blood generating head kidneys of cod from 2011 showed 
more alterations and less compact tissue architecture in 
individuals caught at the dumping sites compared to those 
from the reference area (Figure 1). 
The latter finding influences the risk of cod getting in 
contact with CWA. As an example, Figure 2 shows results 
of the studies on externally visible diseases and parasites 
of cod carried out in December 2011 and 2012. While 
the mean Fish Disease Index (FDI) value at the Bornholm 
dumpsite was high in 2011, it was significantly lower in 
2012 and did not indicate differences between CWA 
dumpsites and the reference areas (B09, B10 and B11). 
Thus, it cannot be excluded that health risks posed by CWA 
vary on the short and the long term scales. In a variable 
environment like the Baltic Sea, the implementation of 













Differantial blood cell counts
Cyto-/genotoxicity Morphological alterations in red blood cells
Neurotoxicity Acetylcholinesterase (AChE) inhibition
Oxidataive stress Antioxidant defence enzymes (e.g. catalase, glutathione reductase)
Table 1: Health and fitness indicators measured in cod from CWA dumpsites and reference sites
Figure 1: Histopathological alterations in head kidney of cod (Gadus morhua)
1 Blood vessel
2 Cluster of haematopoetic cells (HC)
3 Vacuolisation
4 Large interspace between cells
5 Granulom
6 Macrophagic aggregat
7 Parasites in head kidney ducts
Photo a: 
Healthy tissue, displaying many 
blood vessels, dense cluster of HC, 
no interspace between cells and low 
vacuolisation.
Photo b:
Disturbed tissue architecture, with 
low number of blood vessels, large 
interspace between cells, less 
dense HC cluster and makeable 
vacuolisation.
Photo c-f: 
Tissues of head kidneys 
showing alterations such as 
granulomas (a), macrophagic 
aggregates (d) and parasites in 
the head kidney ducts (e, f)
Tissue architecture Tissue alterations and parasites
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References: Chemical Munitions Search & Assessment – a complex evaluation of the dumped munitions problem in the Baltic Sea. Jacek Bełdowski*, 
Zygmunt Klusek, Marta Szubska, Raisa Turja, Anna I. Bulczak, Daniel Rak, Matthias Brenner, Thomas Lang, Lech Kotwicki, Katarzyna Grzelak, Jaromir 
Jakacki, Nicolai Fricke, Anders Ostin, Ulf Olsson, Jacek Fabisiak, Galina Garnaga, Jenny Rattfelt Nyholm, Katja Broeg, Paula Vanninen, Stanisław 
Popiel, Kari Lehtonen, Rune Berglind to be published in Deep Sea Research.
BALTIC COD IN ITS NATURAL HABITAT
Fish Disease Index (FDI) in cod (Gadus morhua) from CHEMSEA sampling areas and campaigns in Dec. 2011 and 2012, summarising data on 
the presence of 7 externally visible diseases and parasites (skin ulceration, skeletal deformities, epidermal hyperplasia/papilloma, fin rot/erosion, 
pseudobranchial pseudotumour, Lernaeocera branchialis, Cryptocotyle lingua). High values reflect elevated disease prevalences. (B13: Bornholm 
dumpsite, B15: Gotland dumpsite, B01: close to dumpsite in the Belt Sea, B14: suspected dumpsite Gdansk Deep, B09: reference site outside Gulf 
of Gdansk, B10 and B11: western reference sites Arkona Sea) 


























Figure 3: Fish Disease Index (FDI)
Dec. 2011 Dec. 2012
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3.1.3. Blue mussels (Mytilus edulis L.)  
Blue mussels are widely used as sentinel species for 
studying the accumulation and biological effects of a 
variety of contaminants present in the marine environment. 
CWA present in the sea bottom of the Bornholm Basin 
study area may induce a variety of adverse biological 
effects in organisms exposed to them. Using the mussel 
as a model organism, the aim of the study was to use 
various biomarker methods representing different 
biological functions and levels of biological organisation to 
allow prediction of potential risks of dumped chemicals to 
aquatic organisms. 
Within the frame of the CHEMSEA project specially 
designed cages were deployed at two different depths 
between May and August 2012 at two selected hotspot 
sites and one reference site in the Bornholm dumping 
area. Based on this hydrographical data, the cages were 
placed at 35 and 65 m depth at all stations. The poor 
oxygen conditions (<1 mg O2 l-1) prevailing in the main 
CW dumping area (average depth ca. 95 m) made caging 
closer to the sea bottom unfeasible.
Mussels for the caging experiment were collected by 
scuba divers on the east coast of Bornholm in Svenske 
Havn. The mussel cages deployed in the Bornholm Basin 
in late May 2012 were successfully retrieved during the 
COMBINE 3 cruise of the R/V Aranda in late August 
2012 (total exposure time 2.5 months). About 400 
mussels were deployed per cage and an additional 400 
mussels were collected to be dissected immediately for 
the “start” condition. In addition, the cages were equipped 
with POCIS (Polar Organic Chemical Integrative Sampler) 
passive samplers to record the accumulation of selected 
organic contaminants as well as hydrography sensors with 
automatic loggers measuring temperature, salinity and 
oxygen at 30 min intervals.
Mortality of the mussels in all 6 cages was in general 
very low and oxygen conditions were relatively good also 
at the depth of 65 m (ca. 4.9 mL/L). Dissecting of the 
mussels for chemical and biomarker analyses started 
immediately and all samples were stored as appropriate 
for each analysis type. Tissue samples taken were 
analysed in close cooperation of three CHEMSEA project 
partners: the Finnish Environment Institute (SYKE), the 
Alfred Wegener Institute Helmholtz Centre for Polar and 
Marine Research (AWI) and the Nature Research Centre 
(NRC). Samples were analysed for a selected battery of 
biomarkers including genotoxic, cytotoxic and neurotoxic 
effects, oxidative stress and lysosomal responses. 
Integrated biomarker response index, sex and gamete 
development, bioenergetic status and concentrations of 
CWAs and their metabolites were assessed for a holistic 
determination of the health status of the caged mussels. 
In addition, samples were also taken for chemical analysis 
to detect CWAs and CWA metabolites in the tissues. In 
a final step, about 400 mussels were collected by scuba 
divers from the same place (Svenske Havn) as in May 
2012 in order to document “end” condition in the natural 
population.
First results show highest biomarker responses at 
both hotspot sites at 65 m. Markedly lower lysosomal 
membrane stability observed in 65 m cages at hotspot 
stations indicated significantly impaired haemocyte 
function compared to all other stations. A somewhat 
lower LMS value at the 65 m reference station compared 
to 35 m stations possibly shows the effect of increased 
general stress due to the e.g. lower oxygen at the 65 
m. Environmental parameters recorded at those depths 
showed that the salinity and the concentration of dissolved 
oxygen fluctuated, indicating mixing of the near bottom 
water in the sub halocline water layer Thus, this makes 
it likely that mussels at 65 m were exposed to CWAs 
and other contaminants present in the sediment or near 
bottom water resulting in the observed biological effects. 
However, it has to be kept in mind that mussels were also 
exposed to lower oxygen concentrations that could, at 
least for a short period of time, induce the change from 
aerobic to anaerobic metabolism and contribute to the 
variation in the observed biological responses. 
References: Anu Lastumäki, Raisa Turja, Kari Lehtonen, Katja Broeg and 





3.1.4. Water fleas (Daphnia magna) 
In addition to blue mussels water fleas are also an indicator 
genus to test the effects of toxins on an ecosystem. Water 
fleas are particularly useful due to their short lifespan and 
reproductive capabilities. For the CHEMSEA project water 
fleas were exposed at the Swedish Defence Research 
Agency (FOI) to slurries and water extracts from sediment 
samples from the Gotland Deep CW dumping site.
The experiment was set up as a static acute toxicity test. 
Glass beakers (50 ml) were filled with 25 ml test solution 
at a concentration of 50% sediment extract. Daphnia 
culture medium was used as diluent. Two experiments 
were run on sediment extracts using Daphnia magna as 
test animal: testing the effect on survival and galactosidae 
activity (Daphnia IQ-test) and testing the effects on 
juvenile growth.
IQ-test and survival: The survival test included juvenile (< 
24 h old) water fleas exposed for 48 h to sediment extracts. 
At the end of experiments number of live individuals was 
counted. In the IQ-test, 4 days old animals were used, and 
exposure lasted the same time. The galatosidase activity 
was measured at the end of this test. 
Juvenile growth: at the start of the test the animals were 
not older than 18 h. The duration of the exposure was 
maximised to 120 h. During the exposure the animals were 
fed daily with green algae at a density of 107 cells/L. Ten 
animals were used in each of two replicates per extract. 
The length of the animals, from the top of the head to 
the base of the spine, was measured at the beginning 
and at the end of the experiment. The animals were 
photographed with a reference (mm). From the photo, the 
length was measured using a calliper. 
The results of the laboratory experiments showed that the 
slurries of the sediments were not toxic to the animals. In 
the experiment on sediment extracts two of the extracts 
affected both the survival and the galactosidase activity. 
In the growth study one extract decreased the growth of 
the juveniles significantly. However, the analysis of the 
sediment samples indicates that none of the three toxic 
samples actually showed traces of compounds related 
to the presence of CWA. Which compound in the three 
sediments samples actually affected the water fleas is yet 
unknown.
DAPHNIA MAGNA - FEMALE ADULT
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Reference: Berglind, R.; Johansson, T.; Akfur, M. C. (forthcoming): Effect of 

































































Size of Daphnia magna after 120 h incubation to sediment extracts from the baltic sea. 
© FOI/CHEMSEA
Effect of sediment extract on survival and galactosidase activity (fluorescence) in juvenile Daphnia magna  
after 48 h exposure. © FOI/CHEMSEA
Sample number: 
1= 3GD Apr. 12; 2 = ROV4; 3 = ROV7+ROV8; 4 = 5GT Apr. 12; 5 = 1 GT Apr. 12; 6 = 2R3RS; 7 = 4ROV Feb. 13+6 m; 8 = ROV11+ROV12; 9 = WH349/B09/1
Sediment  
extracts 50% Blank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 6
% live animals 100 94 100 100 50 89 100 44 72 100
% fluorescent  
of live animals 100 100 100 100 78 100 100 63 85 94
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3.1.5. Chemical analysis of cod and mussel 
tissues
In the evaluation of the risks of dumped CWAs, 
triphenylarsine (TPA) is thought to pose the highest risk 
to the fish community followed by sulphur mustard (H), 
Adamsite (DM) and Clark I (DA)1. The exact effects of 
these chemicals in fish are not known and no information is 
available concerning the relative intake and detoxification 
rates of CWAs in fish tissues or other marine organisms, 
such as mussels 2. The human metabolites of CWAs could 
give a hint about the structure of the fish metabolites but 
the metabolism of fish or other marine organisms may be 
quite different.
The liver is a site of detoxification and chemicals are 
thought to accumulate in it prior to transformation and 
excretion into bile and urine. Fish muscle is also important 
for analysis as it is the part of the fish usually consumed 
and the intact nonpolar chemicals could accumulate in the 
muscle tissue. For these reasons, cod urine, bile and muscle 
tissues were chosen for chemical analysis in addition to 
the whole blue mussels from caging experiments. From 
each of the three stations, 20 fish samples were analysed 
from all selected tissues, a total of 180 samples. The total 
number of pooled blue mussels was 24.
Prediction of metabolites, also called chemical biomarkers, 
is difficult when information about the metabolism of 
CWAs in fish is lacking. However, typical and probable 
metabolic reactions are both hydrolysis and oxidation, 
which occur mainly in the liver. These products could be 
excreted into urine or metabolised further. In addition, 
conjugation reactions are also possible along with other 
metabolic reactions.
Sulphur mustard hydrolyses quickly into thiodiglycol 
(TDG) in aqueous environments. TDG was analysed from 
cod urine and bile as well as from whole mussels. TDG 
could also be found in its oxidised form as thiodiglycol 
sulfoxide and it is reduced to TDG at the beginning 
of sample preparation. Analyses were performed 
using combined gas chromatography–tandem mass 
spectrometry (GC-MS/MS) and the TDG was detected 
as its heptafluorobutyrylimidazole (HBFI) derivative. 
There are also two unequivocal biomarkers of sulphur 
mustard, β-lyase metabolites (SBMSE and MSMTESE), 
which were also analysed from cod urine and bile samples 
as their reduced form as SBMTE using GC-MS/MS. 
Reduction was performed with titanium chloride (TiCl3). 
These metabolites are the result of conjugation reactions 
between sulphur mustard and glutathione (GSH). All 
samples were treated with solid-phase extraction (SPE) 
prior to analysis.
DM, DA and TPA are more lipophilic chemicals than sulphur 
mustard. They were analysed as their oxidation products 
using liquid chromatography–tandem mass spectrometry 
(LC-MS/MS) from cod muscle and mussel samples. 
The sample preparation for these analyses is laborious 
and includes homogenisation, multiple extractions, 
dispersive SPE (dSPE) for lipid removal and filtration. 
TPA was also analysed as an intact chemical from muscle 
and mussel tissues since its nonpolar structure enables 
the accumulation into tissues. This method is under 
development.
All the target chemicals and their analysis methods for 
various tissues are combined in Table 2. The analysis of 
cod and mussel tissues to find possible biomarkers for 
CWA exposure are in progress. Analysis results will be 
available by the end of the CHEMSEA project. 
1 Sanderson, H.; Fauser, P.; Thomsen, M. and Sørensen, P. B. Human health 
risk screening due to consumption of fish contaminated with chemical warfare 
agents in the Baltic Sea, Journal of Hazardous Materials 162 (2009) 416-422.
2 MERCW Deliverable 3.3.4, Literature review of methods for analysis of 
chemicals related to sea-dumped chemical weapons in fish tissues and some 
other biological samples (2008).
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Table 2: Target chemicals for screening cod and mussel samples 





availableintact HFBI TiCl3 intact H2O2
1 Sulphur mustard (H) 
505-60-2 
Dumped CW agent Not analysed as such
1.1 Thiodiglycol (TDG) 
111-48-8 
Hydrolysis  
product of 1 Not analysed as such
1.1F HFBI  








1.1O Thiodiglycol sulfoxide 
3085-45-8 
Oxidation product  
of 1 (either natural 
or with H2O2) 
Not analysed as such (analysed as 1.1F after TiCl3 
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in human 
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2 Adamsite (DM) 
578–94–9







of 2 and all of its 
degradation products 






3 Clark I (DA) 
712–48–1
Dumped CW agent. 
Also component in 
dumped arsine oil.
Not analysed as such
3O Diphenylarsinic acid 
4656–80–8
Oxidation product of 






































3.1.6. Summary: CWA impact on biota
The results of studies on cod health indicate no significant 
generic health effects in cod from CW dumpsites compared 
to reference sites. However, at lower organisational 
levels, such as organ, tissue, cellular and subcellular 
levels, some stress responses could be recorded in cod 
from CW dumpsites using the applied suite of biomarkers. 
Supporting this, higher stress responses were also 
observed in mussels deployed closer to the dumped CW 
(65 m) compared to the respective reference site and to 
mussels caged closer to the water surface (35 m).
The often anoxic conditions in the water bodies surrounding 
the dumped CW in the deep basins of the Baltic Sea 
limit the potential of common biological effect monitoring 
approaches in the field. If oxygen concentrations fall 
below 2 ml/L in the bottom water, marine organisms tend 
to migrate to more oxygenated waters. Therefore, a direct 
exposure of living organisms to the most polluted water 
bodies is unlikely to occur. However, it is well known that 
species such as cod can be found in water layers with very 
low oxygen levels and thus at least a temporary risk of 
direct contact of cod or other species with munitions or 
released toxic compounds of CWA cannot be excluded. 
It seems necessary to extend research and monitoring 
activities both on a time scale, to reduce variability 
coming from changes in environmental conditions, and 
on a geographical scale, so that dumping areas without 
oxygen depletion (e.g. Skagerrak) can be included to 
create a comprehensive monitoring approach. Further, 
more efforts should be placed on conducting laboratory 
exposures using different ecologically relevant key species 
to assess biological effects and uptake mechanisms of 
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4O Triphenylarsine oxide 
1153–05–5
Oxidation product of 










3.2. CWA iN sedimeNts
3.2.1. Screening methods for CWA products
Prior to sediment sampling and analysis CHEMSEA 
partners reviewed analytical screening methods and 
agreed on relevant CWA related compounds to identify 
the presence of the active agent or degradation, hydrolysis 
or biological markers that could demonstrate a history 
of presence and/or exposure to CWA related material. 
The choice of analytical methods and suitable marker 
chemicals was based on a CHEMSEA methodological 
review and VERIFIN experience in the analysis of samples 
taken during the MERCW project in the Bornholm Deep.
In order to catch the widest range of degradation products 
the sediment was extracted using both organic and polar 
solvents. After consideration the selected solvents 
were dichloromethane (DCM) and acetonitrile (ACN), 
respectively. The DCM extract as well as its derivatised 
fractions (using propanethiol) were analysed using either 
gas chromatography-mass spectrometry (GC–MS) or 
gas chromatography-tandem mass spectrometry (GC–
MS/MS). ACN extracts and their oxidised fractions 
(using hydrogen peroxide) were analysed using liquid 
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Additionally, silylated fractions of the ACN extracts 
were analysed using GC–MS or GC–MS/MS. As 
the instrumentation available at the three analysis 
laboratories was different, different solutions for the 
sample preparation had to be taken to allow the full range 
of target chemicals to be analysed.
All the selected analysis methods were targeted to the 
analytes to achieve the best possible sensitivity. Therefore, 
either selected ion monitoring (SIM) or selected reaction 
monitoring (SRM) methods were used. This also means 
that no chemicals outside the list of selected targets could 
be detected.
Table 3: Target chemicals for analysis of sediment samples in CHEMSEA project 





intact PrSH BSTFA intact H2O2
1 Sulphur mustard (H) 
505-60-2 
Dumped CW agent FMV






BSTFA derivative  
of 1.1 FM
1.1O Thiodiglycol sulfoxide 
3085-45-8 
Oxidation product  











1.2O 1,4-Dithiane oxide 
19087-70-8 
Oxidation product  



































BSTFA derivative of 
1.7 FM
2 Adamsite (DM)  
578-94-9






of 2 and all of its 
degradation products 







Derivative of 2 and 
all of its degradation 
products 
FM
3a Clark I (DA) 
712-48-1 
Dumped CW agent. 
Also component in 
dumped arsine oil. 
Not analysed as such











intact PrSH BSTFA intact H2O2
3O Diphenylarsinic acid 
4656-80-8 
Oxidation product of 
3a and 3b and all 
of their degradation 
products (either 
natural or with H2O2) 
FV
3T Diphenylpropylthioarsine 17544-92-2 
Derivative of 3a and 
3b and all of their 
degradation products 
FMV
4 Triphenylarsine (TPA) 
603-32-7 
Component in dumped 
arsine oil 
FMV
4O Triphenylarsine oxide 
1153-05-5 
Oxidation product 
of 4 and all of its 
degradation products 







Dumped CW agent. 
Also component in 
dumped arsine oil.
Not analysed as such
5O Phenylarsonic acid 
98-05-5 
Oxidation product 
of 5 and all of its 
degradation products 








of 8 and all of its 
degradation products 







Derivative of 8 and 
all of its degradation 
products
FMV
7 Lewisite I (L1) 
541-25-3 






of 7 and all of its 
degradation products 













Derivative of 7 and 
all of its degradation 
products 
FMV
8 Lewisite II (L2) 
40334-69-8 











3.2.2. Inter-calibration study  
As the analysis of both organic chemicals and heavy 
metals in the CHEMSEA project was divided between 
different laboratories it was necessary to verify that 
the results obtained  by these laboratories would be 
comparable. Therefore, a transnational inter-calibration 
study was organised to test the methods selected and 
the performance of the laboratories for analysis of the 
selected sea dumped CW and/or their degradation 
products as well as for arsenic. The inter-calibration study 
was coordinated by VERIFIN. 
Samples were sent to four other partners: IO PAN, 
MUT, FOI and LEPA. MUT, FOI and VERIFIN analysed 
the samples for organic CW and/or their degradation 
products and IO PAN, MUT and LEPA analysed the 
samples for organic and total arsenic. The results of the 
inter-calibration study were satisfactory and confirmed 
that all five partners could produce reliable results.
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3.2.3.  Concentrations in sediments 
Sediment samples were collected during five cruises of 
the R/V Oceania (IO PAN) from March 2012 to April 
2013 and a cruise of the R/V Vėjūnas organised by the 
Lithuanian Environment Protection Agency in April 2013. 
The sampling stations at the dumpsites were chosen 
near Class I objects according to sonar data obtained 
by scanning the sea floor by the Swedish Maritime 
Administrations (SMA). Several samples were collected 
with an ROV as close as possible to visible objects 
resembling munitions. 
In addition to the sediment sampling, macrozoobenthos 
samples were collected and hydrological parameters 
measured (water current speed and direction, water 
temperature, salinity and dissolved oxygen). After 
analysing all samples and parameters the data showed 
no drastic changes in the environment at the chemical 
munitions dumpsite compared to previous research, 
although the number of the macrozoobenthos species had 
decreased notably.
Sediment samples were divided into subsamples and 
distributed among three different laboratories for CWA 
analysis – the Military University of Technology (MUT), 
the Finnish Institute for Verification of the Chemical 
Weapons Convention (VERIFIN) and the Swedish 
Defence Research Agency (FOI) – and three laboratories 
who analysed sediments for arsenic concentrations as 
an indicator of arsenic containing CWA – the Lithuanian 
Environment Protection Agency (LEPA), MUT and 
IO PAN. 
CWA
The location of samples, where CWA degradation products 
were detected is presented in Maps section, on figure 6. 
A number of CWA and their degradation products were 
analysed in laboratories with the use of techniques based 
on liquid and gas chromatography coupled with mass 
spectrometry (GC–MS and LC–MS). The details concerning 
the methods used will be published later. The list of target 
chemicals presented in Table 3 includes: chemicals related 
to sulphur mustard, several arsenic-containing chemicals 
as well as a tear gas, a-chloroacetophenon.
From the 179 sediment samples as many as 57 contained 
at least one target chemical. Chemicals related to mustard 
were found in 37 samples and arsenic-containing chemicals 
in 39 samples. Both types of chemicals were detected 
in 19 samples. Comparison of the distance between 
contaminated and non-contaminated samples leads to the 
conclusion that the pollution of sediments with CWA is local 
and strongly depends on the type of seabed, the condition 
of the munitions and the prevailing bottom currents. This 
finding is in line with findings by the MERCW project.
During the MERCW project, only minor traces were found 
of sulphur mustard, which represents a large portion of 
all dumped agents. Therefore, new chemicals related to 
sulphur mustard were included in the list of target chemical 
in the CHEMSEA project compared to the MERCW project. 
This proved successful as mustard-related chemicals were 
detected in 57 of the 179 samples. The best indicators for 
previous presence of sulphur mustard proved to be two 
cyclic mustard degradation products: 1,4,5-oxadithiepane 
and 1,2,5-trithiepane (chemicals 1.4 and 1.5 in Table 3). 
The most typically identified arsenic-containing chemicals 
were degradation products of Clark I. Degradation products 
for Adamsite were detected in 13 samples. Triphenylarsine, 
which is a component of arsine oil used both in arsenic 
containing and mustard related munitions, was detected in 
19 samples. 
When the samples were divided for analysis among the 
three laboratories, portions of the same sediment samples 
were delivered to two laboratories if enough sample was 
available. Most samples could be divided and only a 
few samples had to be analysed in only one laboratory. 
Although the analysis procedure differed slightly between 
laboratories, it was expected that in several cases positive 
identification would be made from both divided portions. It 
was noted that sediment samples were not homogenous 
and that portions of one sample can differ greatly in 
composition. Therefore, if a sample was not identified as 
positive by both laboratories it does not mean that the 
analysis is incorrect. 
Bornholm Deep
A large portion of the 21 samples taken at the 
Bornholm Deep (86 %) was positive i.e. contained 
one or more target chemicals. 16 samples 
contained arsenic-containing chemicals. These 
findings are in line with the results obtained during 
the MERCW project. It was also noted that half of 
the samples (12) contained both mustard-related 
and arsenic-containing chemicals. Intact sulphur 
mustard was found at a very low level in one 
sample that was taken from the primary dumpsite 
located in the Bornholm Deep. 
In the Bornholm area, many of the positive 
identifications were made by both laboratories 




More than half of the samples (108 samples) 
were taken in Gotland Deep. Ten of the samples 
were collected by LEPA in the Lithuanian part of 
Gotland Deep. Here 21 % of the samples were 
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found positive: 12 samples containing mustard 
related chemicals and 12 with arsenic containing 
chemicals. Only one sample contained both types 
of target chemicals. Contamination in Gotland 
Deep is clearly lower than in Bornholm Deep.
In Gotland Deep, only one split sample was found 
positive in two laboratories. However, several 
chemicals were found by at least one laboratory.
Gdansk Deep
In the addition to the previously known dumpsites 
in Bornholm and Gotland Deep, 30 samples 
were taken from the Gdansk Deep, a potential 
CW dumpsite and 8 from nearby region of Gulf 
of Gdansk. According to the analysis results 
10 samples from the Gdansk Deep and one 
sample from the Gulf of Gdansk contained target 
chemicals.
According to these results it seems that the 
suspicions that the Gdansk Deep was also used 
as a chemical dumpsite are correct. This, however, 
still requires final confirmations as nine of the 
eleven positive identifications were made by the 
same laboratory. The other two laboratories did not 
find these samples positive although the detected 
concentrations were relatively high.
Slupsk Furrow 
In addition to the known or suspected dumpsites, 
10 samples were also taken in Slupsk. Three of 
these samples showed contamination. One sample 
out of three from a reference area located near 
Rozewie was found positive. This may indicate that 
CW were dumped in the transport route between 
harbours and areas designated as the official 
dumping sites. The findings from Slupsk Furrow 
also require final confirmation as they were made 
only by one laboratory, the same as in the case of 
Gdansk Deep.
Arsenic
Concentrations of Arsenic in sediments is presented in 
maps section on figure 7. Total arsenic concentrations 
in sediments from chemical munition dumpsites and 
reference areas did not exceed the concentration of 
24 µg/g. Obtained results of As concentration remain 
in the range of geochemical background which amounts 
from 20 to 30 µg/g depending on the literature source. 
Only 13 samples from a total of 179 had concentrations 
exceeding 20 µg/g. The lowest value was detected in the 
Gulf of Gdansk (0.31 µg/g) and the highest in Gotland 
Deep, in the area of the official dumpsite (23 µg/g). 
Total arsenic concentrations differed significantly within 
individual areas. In the reference areas of Slupsk Furrow, 
Gulf of Gdansk and the Lithuanian EEZ in close vicinity 
to the dumpsites mean concentrations ranged from 5.7 
to 9.0 µg/g. The highest mean concentration of As was 
measured in the area of Bornholm Deep and amounted 
to 17 µg/g. The station with the highest concentration 
(22 µg/g) was located in the middle of the dumpsite. 
Mean concentrations of As were also higher in the Gotland 
Deep and Gdansk Deep than those in the reference areas 
and amounted to 13 and 15 µg/g, respectively. In 7 of 
the total 40 samples in which arsenic containing CWAs 
and/or their degradation products were detected, the 
concentrations of As exceeded 20 µg/g and in 16 samples 




























Organic arsenic contents in sediment showed neither 
spatial differences between sampling sites nor a correlation 
with total arsenic, organic matter and heavy metals. This 
may indicate that different methods should be developed 
for easy and inexpensive estimation of arsenic containing 
CWA based on arsenic analyses.
3.2.4. Degradation pathways
In general, as time progresses, the metallic mantles of 
munitions and bulk containers rust and are subject to 
mechanical erosion. At some point, hull integrity will be 
breached and contact between seawater and the chemical 
contents of a munition will be established.
Both CWA mixtures and explosives contained in the 
munition (ie. as bursting charges) are chemicals that 
may have reacted with other materials in the container 
or with themselves. Effectively, this aging process may 
have changed the properties of the chemical contents. 
With regard to CWA, compounds with less pronounced 
or without warfare capabilities may have emerged. 
Explosives, on the other hand, may have lost their 
handling safety and become sensitive to shocks and thus 
more dangerous.
When seawater comes into contact with these chemicals, 
it may act as a solvent or suspension agent. Consequently, 
the chemicals will leak into the environment, first spreading 
locally, possibly entering a sediment sorption / desorption 
equilibrium process and with time will, be distributed on a 
larger scale by hydrological processes and anthropogenic 
activities.
Once under the influence of environmental factors, 
chemicals may also undergo changes by abiotic (e.g. 
reactions with sea water and its components like dissolved 
oxygen or hydrogen sulfide, or closer to the surface, 
sunlight-mediated degradation) or biotic processes (e.g. 
bacteria-mediated biotransformation). 
The propensity to undergo chemical transformations and 
the pathways and modes of environmental distribution, 
taken together the environmental fate of a chemical, 
depend on the nature of the chemical (e.g. reactivity, 
polarity) and on the prevailing ambient conditions (e.g. 
temperature, reaction partners, bacterial population). 
Resulting from these transformations are chemicals that 
may have properties similar to or quite unlike the parent 
compounds. 
Some parent or transformation chemicals will undergo 
fast reactions, in other cases transformations will occur 
only very slowly. The latter chemicals are persistent in 
the environment and, given suitable hydrophobic (fat-
soluble) properties, have the potential to bioaccumulate 
in living organisms via food webs (food chains). Persistent 
organic pollutants (POPs) are one of the principal issues 
in environmental pollution.
With regard to organic chemicals, the highest possible 
stage of chemical breakdown is mineralisation - conversion 
to e.g. carbon dioxide, ammonia, water and hydrogen 
sulfide. In the case of organometallic (e.g. organoarsenic-
based CWA) or inorganic (e.g. metals from containers 
or the primary explosive lead (II) azide from detonators) 
chemical warfare materials, transformations will lead to 
inorganic species of heavy metals which can be converted 
to different organometallic species through biotic 
processes. These latter inorganic and organometallic 
species do occur naturally and their toxic properties 
depend on the chemical “wrapping”, oxidation state and 
nature of the metal atom and may either be pronounced 
or negligible (e.g. arsenobetaine). Nonetheless, since 
the amounts of bioavailable heavy metals introduced by 
anthropogenic activities are considerable in comparison 
to the naturally bioavailable amounts, discharge of heavy 
metals into the environment is one of the principal issues 
of environmental pollution.
The behaviour of the CW munitions on the Baltic seafloor 
depends on two things. The first is how the munitions 
corrode and start leaching. The second is how the 
chemicals in the munitions behave in contact with the 
marine environment.
Leaching 
To assess the threat to the marine environment, Makles 
and Śliwakowski (Makles and Śliwakowski, 1997) 
developed a model according to which, depending of the 
type of ammunitions (containers), mustard gas will escape 
in the following way: 
• Barrels: start 23 years after dumping, complete loss of 
containment after 60 years 
• Bombs: start 46 years after dumping, complete loss of 
containment after 120 years 
• Shells: start 69 years after dumping, complete loss of 
containment after 265 years 
It was later observed that the containers often start 
leaching after point corrosion. This means that a hole is 
corroded through the wall material at a weak point. The 
effect of this is that the start of the leaching process is 
quite unpredictable and can occur faster than expected. 
Witkiewicz (Witkiewicz, 1997) claims that the transition 
of toxic agents into the surrounding water will take place 
mainly by way of diffusion. It is, by nature, a slow process 
and will additionally be hindered by the fact that the toxic 
agents escaping the ammunition and containers may 
be covered by a layer of seabed sediments. Therefore, 
he claimed that the concentration of toxic agents in 
the surrounding water will not be high and that the 
concentration of products of hydrolysis of the toxic agents 
will be small. 
In the years 2000 through 2003, a significant increase 




observed in the Baltic. The causes of the increase have 
not yet been identified (CBWCB, 2004, 2005, 2009), 
but the observation correlates well with the period of 
complete loss of containment of barrels.
CWA behaviour on the sea bottom
The behaviour of chemical substances in the marine 
environment depends both on the chemical and physico-
chemical properties of the substances and on the impact 
of environmental factors. Dissolution of CWA in the 
sea is considered to be an important first stage of their 
decomposition.
The maximum solubility of CWA in water is about 2,300 
mg/l (triphenylchloroarsine). Hydrogen cyanide (also 
known as Zyklon B) is an exception as its solubility in 
water amounts to about 95,000 mg/l (Sanderson et al., 
2008). In real conditions in the seawater, the maximum 
concentration of CWA will be less than 10 % of their 
theoretical solubility, and that only for a short period of 
time. As a result of further dissolution, dilution and the 
reaction of decomposition, the possibility of occurrence of 
high concentrations of CWAs in the seawater is unlikely. 
For phosgene and tabun, which easily solve in water, the 
initial concentration after release may be much higher.
In the marine environment tabun hydrolyses into 
phosphoric acid and hydrogen cyanide, which further 
breaks down to formic acid. At the temperature of 7 °C its 
half-life time equals approximately 5 hours. Thus, it poses 
a rather short-term threat to the marine environment, 
only when it occurs in high concentrations (Korzeniewski, 
1996).
Phosgene hydrolysis is even faster, as the half-life even at 
0 °C equals 20 seconds (for a 1 % solution). This is caused 
by the pH of the seawater, which buffers HCl and CO2 
resulting from phosgene decomposition (Korzeniewski, 
1996).
Remaining CWA are characterised by lower breakdown 
rates and can be considered persistent pollutants.
Despite the initial rapidity of the hydrolysis reaction, 
sulphur mustard persists in the marine environment for 
decades. During such a long exposure to the impact of 
seawater and sediments, the hydrolysis of dissolved 
mustard is usually relatively fast, whereas the hydrolysis 
of un-dissolved mustard is slow, so both the hydrolysis 
rate and the dissolution rate of mustard gas must be 
taken into account. This factor causes the mustard 
degradation process to take weeks or years. Many 
varieties of mustard are present in the Baltic Bottom, this 
includes relatively pure sulphur mustard as well as various 
types of mixtures which can be more viscous or contain 
arsine oil (winter-grade mustard). The main mustard gas 
degradation pathway is supposed to be thiodiglycol and 
hydrochloric acid, while sulphur mustard degradation 
reaction is similar but even slower due to the presence of 
water insoluble thickening agents. Mustard is known to 
also form various cyclic degradation products in addition 
to many other products. The degradation products are 
typically less toxic than mustard and hydrolysis products 
are more water soluble. 
Degradation pathways for sulphur mustard
In the years 1998-99, detailed laboratory tests of the 
mustard gas lump caught on 9 January 1997 were 
performed in the Military University of Technology in 
Warsaw. During the tests, chromatographic techniques 
(GC-MS, GC-AED) were employed. About 50 various 
chemical compounds of differing toxicity were found in the 
lump of mustard gas, while their chemical structure was 
identified in 30 cases. Those included sesqui mustard and 
its analogues as well as oxidized compounds. However, 
no thiodiglycol was detected, probably due to the high 
solubility of this compound (Mazurek et al., 2001). 
Pursuant to the MEDEA report, the most probable time 
of decomposition of mustard gas lumps weighing 1 kg 
amounts to about 8 months (typical chemical ammunition), 
about 18 months for lumps weighing 10 kg (chemical 
artillery shell) and about 31 months for lumps weighing 
100 kg (air bomb). However, mustard gas has the tendency 
to form gels with a jelly or rubbery consistency, with a 
polymer skin preventing further decomposition (Mazurek 
et al., 2001).
Besides mustard gas, arsenic-containing compounds 
(Clark I and II, Lewisite and Adamsite), as well as 
a-chloroacetophenone are not readily water soluble 
either and hydrolyse even harder than mustard gas. 
During MERCW project research, a lump was found 
on one of the wrecks. Its analysis revealed that it was 
a-chloroacetophenone. The chemical structure of this 
compound suggests that no biodegradation could 
occur. After dehalogenation (due to hydrolysis), non-
toxic compounds are created, which might decompose 
completely in the seawater.
Clark I hydrolysis in water will lead to diphenylarsinous 
acid and hydrochloric acid and Clark II will lead to hydrogen 
cyanide and diphenylarsinous acid. Both hydrochloric acid 
and hydrogen cyanide are toxic but they will be detoxified 
quickly in water, so the toxic effects are short-term 
and local. Both arseno-organic compounds decompose 
later into toxic, inorganic arsenic compounds which are 
assimilated by organisms, adsorbed to the sediments and 
suspensions, desorbed and transported in dissolved form 
in the water column.
Adamsite hydrolyses into phenarsazin-10(5H)-ol and 
hydrochloric acid. Degradation of Adamsite is very 
similar to that of the clarks and degradation products 
are persistent, spread slowly and can undergo 
bioaccumulation. 
Lewisite reacts with water to form chlorovinyl arsine 
oxide, which can be further decomposed into toxic arsenic 
acid and acetylene. 
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3.2.5. Summary:  Concentrations in sediments
Different environmental factors like temperature, salinity, 
oxygen presence or depletion, sediment type and chemistry 
or presence of bacteria, as well as their specific combination 
affect chemical processes in the marine environment. 
Chemicals undergo constant transformations and change 
their structure and properties. Therefore the main interest 
in detecting CWA in environmental samples is on their 
different degradation products. Derivatives or oxidation 
products of sulphur mustard, Adamsite, Clark I and Clark 
II, triphenylarsine, Lewisite I and Lewisite II were found 
in sediments. Despite the differences between parent 
chemicals and derivatives, most of the CWA degradation 
products have similar toxic properties to those of the 
chemicals they originate from. Furthermore, remaining 
CWA derivatives have lower breakdown rates and can be 
considered as persistent pollutants. Nearly one third of 
samples collected in the CHEMSEA project contained at 
least one trace of chemical munitions. In comparison only 
in one sample was intact sulphur mustard detected. 
Pollution with CWA is most clearly visible in the Bornholm 
Deep. In this area nearly all analysed samples contained 
CWA derivatives. Arsenic containing CWA were found 
in 14 of the 21 total samples collected in the Bornholm 
Basin area. Total arsenic concentrations were also 
elevated in that region compared to background levels. 
Only in samples taken on the transect in growing distance 
from the primary or secondary Bornholm dumpsite 
did concentrations of arsenic decrease and no arsenic 
containing CWA were found in the sediment. 
In the Gotland Deep dumping area the situation is more 
diversified. A number of sediment samples were free from 
CWA pollution and total arsenic concentrations did not 
show contiguous spatial distribution despite high mean 
concentration. It can thus be suggested that pollution 
of sediments with CWA is local and strongly dependent 
on spot environmental features. This also shows that the 
disposal of chemical weapons was more spread within the 
Gotland dumpsite. 
In the Gdansk Deep area considered to have been a 
potential dumping site, pollution with CWA was confirmed 
in half of the samples and mean arsenic concentration was 
also elevated in comparison with the reference area. 
In all areas of interest there is a relation visible between 
total arsenic concentration and presence of arsenic 
containing chemicals related to CW although in very few 
cases did arsenic contents exceed the biogeochemical 
background estimated for the whole Baltic Sea.
According to the estimates of corrosion and leaching 
duration and the natural processes affecting CWA 
transformations and environmental conditions there is a 
possibility that the transition of toxic chemicals from the 
remaining weapon to the surrounding environment will 
constantly increase in time. Further monitoring of chemical 
pollution in dumping areas is necessary. It is important 
both for estimating the status of chemical ammunition and 
containers and for further survey of pollution threats to 
the environment.
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• Unified model of contingency plans 
• CHEMSEA Awareness Trainings 
• Guidelines on CWA contamination at sea 
• Recommendations for hazardous waste disposal 




ACCoRdiNg to A ChemseA AssessmeNt, eXistiNg 
NAtioNAl CoNtiNgeNCy plANs foR eVeNts of 
CWA leAKAge ANd ACCideNtly-fished muNitioNs 
iN the BAltiC seA RegioN ARe ofteN outdAted 
ANd iNCoheReNt. ChemseA pARtNeRs deVeloped 
joiNt guideliNes foR RisK gRoups, uNdeRWAteR 
opeRAtioNs ANd CoNtAmiNAted sedimeNt 
tReAtmeNt ANd deVeloped A BluepRiNt foR  
A joiNt CoNtiNgeNCy plAN. 
ChemseA fiNdiNgs
4.1. uNified model of 
CoNtiNgeNCy plANs
The Baltic States, acting in accordance with the HELCOM 
CHEMU Report of 1995 and taking the safety of crewmen 
into account, have prepared instructions for fishermen 
to follow in the event of catching  post war chemical 
munitions. However, nowadays such instructions seem too 
general and out-dated, leading to numerous difficulties in 
defining a EU-unified code of conduct that ship  captains 
should follow in case of accidental catch of CW.
Moreover, the lack of regulations and knowledge 
concerning the responsibilities of national authorities in 
the area of decontamination procedures usually results 
in re-dumping of dangerous chemicals back into the sea, 
without reports to the appropriate authorities.
Therefore, one of the main goals of the CHEMSEA 
project was to develop a unified code of conduct in case 
of accidental catch of chemical munitions at sea or shoring 
on the beach, that may be implemented in all Baltic 
States, resulting in a unification of reaction procedures 
and national contingency plans.
A framework of research was developed which is focused 
on current national contingency plans and national threat 
reaction models. The study included, but was not limited 
to, the following research questions:
1. Are national procedures in case of CW catching / 
shoring already in existence?
2. Are national bodies responsible for contingency 
planning already designated?
3. Is the contact information for such bodies well known 
and widely available?
4. How are CW treated in case of accidental catching / 
shoring?
5. Which body initiates the response operation in case of 
a CW related threat?
6. Are standard forms of CW related incident 
documentation available?
7. Are national decontamination procedures established?





The matrix of research results allowed reaching the 
following main conclusions:
1. The Baltic States possess national services and 
agencies capable of taking action in order to minimise 
the threat posed by fished / shored CW, but their 
actions differ significantly.
2. The authority to be notified first in case of CW related 
accidents at sea would be the VTS  / MRC  (JRC) / 
MRCC  (JRCC) officer – SAR Service in general.
3. Accident documentation, where available, is 
decentralised and incoherent.
4. Guidelines for fishermen exist in selected states but are 
out-dated.
5. Guidelines or routines (Standard Operating Procedures) 
for national contingency planning bodies are incoherent 
and require unification.
The research proved that current procedures and 
safety recommendations for accidentally or deliberately 
recovered CW munitions are regulated primarily by 
national legislation, taking HELCOM recommendations 
and guidelines into account.  Common practice seems to 
be that accidentally recovered munitions are deliberately 
re-dumped, which does not comply with the Chemical 
Weapons Convention (OPCW 1997), but may be in 
particular the only way to ensure the safety of crewmen.
In order to get rid of identified discrepancies CHEMSEA 
drafted, consulted and endorsed a unified process or 
model of reaction against the threat posed by accidently 
recovered or shored CW. The model was developed and 
introduced in the context of two generalised scenarios of 
contact with CW:
1. CW threat at sea – the sea scenario,
2. CW accident on the beach – the land scenario.
ADS - Ammunition Disposal Services of Schleswig-Holstein and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania
AF - Armed Forces’ units
CG - Coast Guard
VTS - Vessel Traffic Service
MRC - Maritime Rescue Centre
JRC - Joint Rescue Centre
MRCC - Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre
JRCC - Joint Rescue Coordination Centre
SAR - The Maritime Search and Rescue Service (SAR Service)
Table 1. The matrix of the national contingency plans analyses
n.d. – no data
     
1. + + + + + +
2. + + + + + +
3. + + + / – + / – + + / –
4. ADS AF AF AF AF CG 
5. VTS / MRCC MRC MRCC MRCC VTS / MRCC SMA / JRCC
6. decentralized decentralized n.d. decentralized decentralized n.d.
7. deployable deployable n.d. n.d. deployable deployable
8. yes ‘90 yes ‘97 no n.d. yes ‘98 yes ‘90
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Fig. 1. The model of reaction against threat posed by CWA – Sea Scenario


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fig. 2. The model of reaction against threat posed by CWA – Land Scenario

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Both models identify bodies responsible for reacting 
against the threat and actions to be conducted in order to 
secure both people and the environment.
The key elements of the sea scenario, depicted in 
Figure 1, are:
• Ship at sea: endangered after accidental catch of 
suspicious items in the fishing or dredging gear
• Search and rescue centre (SAR): initiates rescue 
operation after being notified about the accident and 
being called for assistance
• Harbour master’s office: prepares and isolates 
the mooring pier in order to conduct the ship’s 
decontamination operation
• Decontamination unit: conducts ship’s decontamination
• Medical aid personnel: takes care of injured 
crewmembers brought to the harbour or evacuated 
from the vessel at sea
Vessel crewmembers should be alert for the following 
signs that a chemical munition or chemical agents are 
present onboard:
• Unusual odour from equipment or fish
• Stinging sensations in the eyes
• Burning or irritated skin
• Presence of an oily liquid
• Corroded containers or suspicious clay-like lumps
In the case of catch or extraction of such a substances 
the ship’s captain is obliged to take every possible 
precautionary measure to remove the dangerous 
substances from the vessel (Note: If a munition is 
encountered while in harbour, the land scenario should 
be initiated). When the dangerous substances have been 
removed from the vessel the captain should:
• Note the position of removal (re-dumping) of dangerous 
materials
• If possible, mark the position with a buoy of yellow 
colour
Afterwards, the SAR Centre should be immediately 
notified and provided the following information:
• The vessel’s position (use World Geodetic System 
1984 [WGS-84] for reporting). If the exact position is 
unknown, approximate coordinates should be given or 
a range and bearing from a charted feature.
• The activity (e.g. fishing, clamming, dredging) being 
conducted when the munition was encountered.
• A general description of the munition’s key features 
(e.g. size, shape, fins, markings) and overall condition, 
if observed or known.
• Any unusual odours.
• The actions taken (e.g., secured munition on deck, 
munition carefully returned to the water, washed off 
deck where munition was retrieved to protect the crew).
The ship’s captain should maintain a radio watch in order 
to be provided with further instructions and should strictly 
follow any instructions received. Particularly, vessels that 
may have come in contact with chemical agents should 
not bring their catch ashore, unless instructed to do so. 
Prior to entering the harbour, the appropriate harbour 
master’s office should indicate a mooring pier, located 
as far as possible from other vessels already moored in 
the harbour. It is forbidden to unload or get any materials 
off the vessel before the decontamination unit arrives to 
inspect and decontaminate the vessel.
The key elements of the land scenario, depicted in Figure 
2, are as follows:
• Potential finder: usually unaware of possible threat 
connected with suspicious object washed ashore
• Crisis management centre: represents the local 
emergency services called by a finder requesting 
assistance
• Police / fire departments: take in situ actions to isolate 
and secure the area of the finding
• Decontamination unit: conducts decontamination of 
people and finding
• Medical aid personnel: provides medical assistance to 
the injured or burned
Similarly to the sea scenario, the finder should be alert for 
the following signs that a chemical munition or chemical 
agents are present in the object washed ashore:
• Unusual odour of the object found
• Stinging sensations in the eyes
• Burning or irritated skin
• Presence of an oily liquid
• Corroded containers or suspicious clay-like lumps
In case of finding a suspicious object ashore, it is strictly 
forbidden to approach, move, dismantle or touch the 
object. Additionally, a safe distance should be kept at all 
times. Notification of the finding should be directed to the 
nearest police or fire department station or emergency 
response centre.
Having received a notification concerning a CW related 
accident ashore, the emergency response centre 
forwards the notification to local police stations, rescue 
departments (fire departments) and medical ambulance 
services. Resources and manpower are sent to the scene 
of the accident in order to secure the area and transport 
routes (police), diagnose the accident scene (rescue / 
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fire department) and provide medical assistance (medical 
ambulance). 
If initial diagnosis of the accident scene confirms the 
presence of CWA, a specialised decontamination unit 
is called in to conduct the decontamination, remedy 
the consequences of contamination and restore the 
environment to an appropriate state.
The above general models of reaction against threats 
posed by accidently recovered or shored CW were 
compared with national contingency plans in order 
to reveal strengths and weaknesses of state specific 
solutions. As a result, CHEMSEA encouraged national 
authorities of Baltic States to introduce improvements to 
their current procedures.
4.2. ChemseA AWAReNess 
tRAiNiNgs
In addition to focusing on national contingency plans and 
unified reaction models against CW threats, CHEMSEA 
conducted research to evaluate the level of awareness 
of working groups that may potentially come in contact 
with CW. This primarily included fishermen and offshore 
industry employees.
Despite the existence of national plans concerning 
trainings for fishermen and offshore industry employees, 
CHEMSEA disclosed negligence in the implementation 
of such trainings. As this confusion has adverse 
consequences for the safety of maritime operations, an 
independent Awareness Training Program was prepared 
and conducted in Baltic States to spread knowledge on 
chemical munitions dumped at sea and to introduce best 
practices in minimising the threats posed by CWA.
The primary target group addressed by the CHEMSEA 
Awareness Trainings were fishermen. CHEMSEA 
cooperated closely with local fishermen’s associations and 
organised a number of trainings for fishermen in harbours, 
e.g. trainings in Hel, Władysławowo, Krynica Morska 
(Poland), Klaipeda (Lithuania), and Helsinki (Finland).
Information delivered during the trainings included:
• Location of CW in the Baltic Sea
• Possible effects on humans and the environment
• Appropriate protective measures
• Proper behaviour in case of potential contamination
• First aid in case of contamination
The main part of each awareness training focused on 
measures to be taken onboard in order to secure crew 
members in case of contact with CW at sea.
FIG. 3. AWARENESS TRAINING FOR LITHUANIAN FISHERMEN AT KLAIPEDA (AUGUST 2013)
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4.3. guideliNes oN CWA 
CoNtAmiNAtioN At seA
As far as any type of munitions present a potential 
explosive or chemical agent hazard, they should not 
be moved, disturbed or handled. However, at sea and 
depending on the circumstances, precautionary actions 
may be required to protect the vessel and crew members. 
Therefore, in case of catch or extraction of hazardous or 
noxious substances of military origin, particularly CWA, 
the following actions should be taken:
• Do not touch neither caught or extracted materials nor 
the fishing equipment or potentially contaminated parts 
of the vessel
• Keep contaminated parts of the vessel leeward, if 
possible
• Close hatches and windows of the wheelhouse and 
compartments
• Collect the clothing of crew members who came into 
contact with contaminants in the foil sacks and tighten 
them firmly
• Report the accident to the SAR officer / Harbour 
master, providing the following information:
• What, where, when and by whom has been caught or 
extracted
• Crewmembers who may have been contaminated or 
injured
• Keep a radio watch in order to be provided with further 
instructions
• Follow instructions given by the SAR officer / Harbour 
master,
• If ordered, steer the vessel to the forefront of the 
nearest harbour
When a munition is recovered by the fishing gear but not 
brought onboard:
• Stop all fishing operations immediately
• Do not try to bring the munition or gear containing the 
suspected object / contaminant onboard
• Do not allow the munition to come or remain alongside 
the vessel, where sea waves could cause the munition 
to contact the hull
• Lower the fishing gear carefully back into the water, 
note its position and report it to the SAR officer / 
Harbour master,
• If possible, mark the position with a yellow buoy
• Await assistance and follow further instructions, as 
ordered by the SAR officer / Harbour master.
When the munition has been brought onboard:
• Immediately secure the munition to prevent its 
movement
• Keep the crew upwind and away from the munition / 
contaminant
• Minimise handling and decide whether it is safest to 
return the contaminant to the water or retain it onboard.
When the munition remains onboard:
• Keep the crew upwind and away from the munition / 
contaminant
• Minimise handling and avoid disturbing any part of the 
munition
• Secure the munition on deck to prevent its movement; 
do this as far away as possible from heat sources, 
vibrations and crew members
• Cover the munition with wet blankets or wet cloths to 
reduce the potential for deterioration of metal parts 
and release of its contents and to reduce the risk of 
explosives drying up and becoming more sensitive to 
shock
• Immediately contact the SAR officer / Harbour master 
for assistance
• Await assistance and follow further instructions as 
ordered by the SAR officer / Harbour master
If, despite precautionary actions taken, any crew member 
comes into contact with CWA:
• Immediately remove any lumps or drops of toxic 
substance from the skin using the back side of a knife 
or similar object, clean pieces of fabric, etc.
• Carefully wash the contaminated skin with fresh water 
mixed with soap
• After drying, decontaminate the skin using the 
decontamination package (if available)
• Do not perforate the blisters on the skin – they keep the 
body from further penetration by the chemical agents
• Report the accident to a SAR officer / Harbour master 
and request assistance
• Place contaminated crew members in a separate 
compartment or on a windward deck and wait for 
professional assistance, as ordered by the SAR Officer 
/ Harbour master
In case of eye irritation:
• Never rub the eyes, even if they sting
• Wash the eyes with large amounts of fresh water, in the 
direction from the nose toward the external corners
• After washing, close the eyelids and wash the skin 
around the eyeballs with freshwater mixed with soap
• Do not use any ointments, do not bandage the eyes
Visible skin symptoms of CWA contamination may 
not appear immediately, only following hours or days. 
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Therefore, in every single case when the crew member 
observes a suspicious object in the fishing gear or an 
unusual smell in the caught fishes or the fishing gear itself 
resulting in stinging of the eyes or throat, it should be 
assumed that the vessel might have been contaminated 
with chemical munitions and all the precautionary actions, 
described above should be taken. 
 
4.4. ReCommeNdAtioNs foR 
hAzARdous WAste disposAl
In order to effectively manage hazardous waste 
(contaminated sediments, fish, etc.), all stakeholders, 
crews of fishing vessels and offshore companies operating 
on the seabed should follow three basic principles:
1. MINIMIZE EXPOSURE
Take all necessary precautions when working with 
contaminated sediments and other materials. As a means 
of minimising potential exposure, do not touch anything 
with bare hands and do not breathe vapours.
2. DO NOT UNDERESTIMATE RISKS 
Ensure that the risk associated with each sample of 
contaminated sediment or other material is assessed, 
understood and communicated to the appropriate 
personnel. It is very important to assume that all 
contaminated sediments and other materials are very 
dangerous and that they should be handled with great 
caution.
3. USE PROPER COUNTERMEASURES 
The use of personal protective equipment, and limitation 
of protection it offers, together with proper administrative 
procedures should be understood by all users. Ensure that 
all staff are properly trained in accordance with regulatory 
requirements so that they can perform their tasks safely.
The following are key management issues for handling 
contaminated materials, including sediments. Regulations 
regarding the proper storage of hazardous materials 
are complex. The schematic procedures for dealing with 
contaminated sediments are shown in Figure 4 below.
Different methods for treating and handling sediments 
are currently being developed. They include isolating the 
contaminants from the rest of the sediments by separating 
the smallest grains (since contaminants tend to stick to 
them) and separating the oily part of the sediment (which 
contains most of the toxic organic compounds).
Sometimes sediment is incinerated in order to destroy 
organic contaminants. Other times, setting agents such 
as cement are added to solidify the sediment and prevent 
contaminants from being released into the environment. 
Bacteria and fungi may also be added to break down 
the contaminants; this process is called bioremediation. 
Advanced treatment approaches such as these are 
promising but often expensive.
Fig.4. Schematic procedure of dealing with contaminated 
sediment and/or other contaminated materials
Extraction of contaminated sediment  
or/and other materials
Can contaminated material be removed on the site ?
If YES If NO
Container should be taken to 
the harbour.
Container should be taken to 
the harbour.
Decontamination of hazardous 
waste on site, using the 
available decontamination kit.
Contaminated sediments and/
or other materials should be 
packed to the containers with 
great caution.
The residue after 
decontamination should be 
enclosed in a container.
For the safety, the container  
with contaminated materials 
should be tightly closed in 
another container.
Container should be 
transferred to the appropriate 
Chemical Decontamination 
Units.
Container should be 










CHEMSEA proposes two strategies for dealing with 
contaminated sediments and/or other materials. The 
first strategy is based on the knowledge and available 
equipment possessed by the interested companies 
and the ship’s crew. In this strategy, the contaminated 
sediments and/or other materials are disposed of 
on site. This strategy is only possible when 
workers and the vessel’s crew are properly 
trained and possess appropriate equipment for 
decontamination. In this situation decontamination of 
the sediments and/or other materials can be carried out 
on site, but can only be performed by qualified 
personnel!!! After decontamination, all sediments and/
or other materials should be sealed in containers and 
delivered to the harbour. Extraction and decontamination 
of sediments and/or other materials should be reported 
to the appropriate regional and/or national authority. The 
residue present after decontamination should be passed 
on to the unit responsible for chemical retrieval (Chemical 
Decontamination Unit).
The second strategy applies to the company employees, 
ship crew and other personnel who do not possess 
proper equipment and/or proper training to conduct 
decontamination of sediments and/or other materials. 
All operations performed on contaminated 
sediments and/or other materials must be 
done with extreme caution!!! Contaminated 
sediments and/or other materials should be packed in 
sealed containers. All operations involving the sealing 
of containers with contaminated sediments should be 
performed wearing protective gloves. Vapours from 
contaminated sediments and/or other materials should 
not be inhaled. Containers with contaminated sediments 
and/or other materials should be tightly closed in a 
second container and must then be delivered to the 
harbour. Extraction of contaminated sediments and/or 
other materials should be reported to the appropriate 
regional and/or national authority. The contaminated 
sediment and/or other materials should be passed on to 
the unit responsible for the chemical retrieval (Chemical 
Decontamination Unit).
4.5. teChNiCAl AspeCts of CWA 
CoNtAmiNAted sedimeNts 
disposAl
Offshore-industry operations carried out in the Baltic Sea, 
particularly in areas close to CWA dumpsites, require 
that worst-case scenarios be anticipated. Specifically, it 
is probable that sludge extracted from the Baltic seabed 
could contain extremely hazardous CWA, e.g. Sarin or 
Tabun.
The worst-case scenario leaves no time for deliberations 
of what should be done with a CWA hazardous find. When 
discovering a dangerous chemical from the group of 
organophosphoric compounds in the excavated sediments, 
actions must be taken immediately.
Therefore, guidelines on methods and techniques for 
destruction or decontamination of CWA hazardous 
compounds in place were reviewed within the CHEMSEA 
framework in the perspective of agents dumped to 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2. Guidelines on CWA decontamination methods and technologies – main reactive systems for decontamination
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the Baltic, and the state they might be in, to support 
decontamination operations.
The main reactive systems for decontamination of all 
types of chemical warfare agents have been collected in 
Table 2 and are described below. The list was created upon 
assumption of taking such decontaminants into account, 
that could be used for disposal of CWA toxic substances, 
ensure effectiveness and versatility and remain stable 
during storage.
1. Aqueous and aqueous-alcoholic alkaline 
solutions as decontamination media for CWA
Bases may be present as active components of anhydrous 
or aqueous solutions for decontamination. With regard to 
the reaction of bases with CWA it is often described as 
the neutralisation of toxic properties or loss of the CWA 
under the influence of the bases. Reactivity of alkaline 
decontamination solutions depends on many factors. To 
correctly choose the chemicals and the decontamination 
environment, nucleophilicity and basicity should be 
considered as well as the impact of the type of solvent 
and catalyst contained in the decontamination solution. 
One can, however, ignore the impact of factors such 
as: temperature, concentration, solubility, etc. The 
nucleophilicity of the decontamination agent is its relative 
reactivity. The concept of nucleophilicity cannot be clearly 
defined and it is understood that the nucleophile has the 
capability of electron transfer to the carbon atom, which 
has a partial positive charge.
2. Aqueous hypochlorite solutions
Hypochlorite solutions (commonly known as bleach) are 
very efficient decontaminants for numerous CWAs, but 
they are corrosive. Although they meet the requirements 
for detoxifying contaminated material, the utility of 
the material after decontamination may be doubtful or 
problematic.
• Common household bleach is an aqueous 
solution of 2-6% sodium hypochlorite (NaOCl). Usually 
it contains 5% sodium hypochlorite, but sometimes 
calcium hypochlorite is used. It can be used for 
decontamination of equipment. A dilute solution of 
bleach decontaminates through both oxidation and 
hydrolysis. The effectiveness of bleach solutions can 
be improved by introducing stronger oxidants to the 
system. Hypochlorite is effective when it is used in 
excess quantities and given sufficient reaction time.
• High test hypochlorite (HTH) is composed of 
calcium hypochlorite [Ca(OCl)Cl + Ca(OCl)2] as a 
solid powder or 7% aqueous slurry. The mixture contains 
approximately 70% available chlorine. Because HTH 
is a strong oxidizing agent, it is very corrosive. This 
composition is effective in destroying HD and G agents.
• Super tropical bleach (STB) is a mixture of 
95% calcium hypochlorite [Ca(OCl)2] with a strong 
base calcium oxide (CaO). STB contains at least 30% 
available chlorine. CaO in solution produces Ca(OH)2. 
STB is prepared as a solid powder or as 7, 13, 40, or 
70% by weight aqueous slurries. This bleach is more 
stable than common bleaches. Similar to HTH, STB is 
an effective decontaminant for HD and G agents. STB 
and HTH are standard U.S. Army field decontaminants. 
However, STB is extremely irritating, causes corrosion 
to metals and may ignite spontaneously when it comes 
in contact with certain materials.
• Hydantoin (dichlorodimethylhydantoin or 
DCDMH), is an organic halamine. DCDMH was 
developed in the 1990s by the U.S. Army. Because it 
has greater chlorinating power than HTH or STB, it has 
been used to detoxify HD, nitrogen mustard, Lewisite, 
and phosgene (carbonyl chloride).
• Dutch powder contains Ca(OCl)2 and MgO. This 
powder has been used by some European countries.
• Activated solution of hypochlorite (ASH) was 
developed in the 1960s. The general formula ASH by 
weight percent is: calcium hypochlorite (0.5%), sodium 
dihydrogen phosphate buffer (0.5%), Triton X-100 
surfactant (0.05%), and water (98.95%).
• Self-Limiting Activated Solution of 
Hypochlorite (SLASH) is 0.5% aqueous solution of 
calcium hypochlorite buffered with sodium citrate/citric 
acid and detergent. SLASH successfully eliminates 
chemical agents such as: HD, GA, GB and GD. Both 
ASH and SLASH are much less corrosive than STB.
3. Anhydrous alkoxide solutions as nucleophile 
decontaminants
In recent years, more attention has been paid to the 
universally active decontamination liquids; these liquids 
are a mixture of alkali alkoxides, alcohol and amines. 
Their composition is very different and depends on the 
type of used amines and alcohols. In general they contain 
from 0.5 to 1 mol of alkali alkoxides (lithium or sodium), 
which is obtained based on alcohol, aminoalcohol or 
alkoxialcohol. If the mixture does not have aminoalcohols, 
then the mixture must contain from 50 to 70% of amine or 
mixture of amines. Most preferred are polyamines such as 
ethylenediamine, diethylenetriamine, triethylenetetramine 
and propylenediamine. If amino alcohols are applied, then 
the polyamine remains at a high level. Most often amines 
are mixed with higher alcohols, such as hexylene glycol or 
propylene glycol monomethyl ether. Amine content should 
be at a high level, due to reaction with CWA (decreases 
their concentration) and because their efficiency is 




The high amine content ensures high reactivity of the 
decontamination mixture. The U.S. Patent No. 3079346 
recommends that decontamination solutions be composed 
of: recommended in U.S. Patent No. 3079346 that 
decontamination solutions be composed of:
• 1 to 10% of NaOH,
• 20 to 40% of methoxyethanol, and
• 50 to 79% of primary, secondary or tertiary amines, 
especially diethylenetriamine and ethylenediamine.
The most recommended decontamination solution has the 
following composition:
• 2% of NaOH,
• 28% of methoxyethanol (CH3O-CH2CH2-OH),
• 70% of diethylenetriamine (H2N–CH2CH2NH-CH2CH2–
NH2) or 70% of ethylenediamine (H2N-CH2CH2NH2)
This decontamination mixture is denoted by the symbol 
DS-2 (Decontaminating Solution 2) and used in the armed 
forces of many countries, including the U.S. and Germany. 
This mixture does not need to be diluted and can be used 
after transportation by the extinguishing spray apparatus, 
whether there are small or large decontamination 
aggregates. Decontamination agent DS-2 mixed with 
water in any proportions and during mixing of the solution 
must be heated strongly. The Flash Point of DS-2 is about 
80°C. DS-2 causes corrosion of aluminium containers and 
containers covered with a layer of cadmium, tin or zinc. 
Other metals do not corrode.
4. Oxidizing systems as a CWA decontaminants
 
Adding 1% hydrogen peroxide to 0.1 M sodium hydroxide 
can sufficiently accelerate the reaction between sodium 
hydroxide and selected chemical warfare agents. The half-
life for disappearance of some agents in the absence of 
the peroxide is many hundreds times greater. G-agents 
(Tabun, Sarin) would be rapidly hydrolyzed not only 
because of catalysis by the hydroperoxide anion but 
simply because of the high pH.
• Fichlor (sodium N,N-dichloroisocyanurate) is a stable 
oxidizer and hydrolysis catalyst. Fichlor reagent reacts 
in water to produce hypochlorous acid. It has been used 
extensively in the food and beverage industry as an 
antimicrobial detergent. 
• Chloramine-B (sodium N-chlorobenzenesulfonamide) 
is a stable, water soluble, oxidizing compound. It has 
been used to decontaminate HD. Chloramine-B is 
less corrosive than other bleaches. It was  developed 
as a towelette impregnated with chloramine-B used 
in conjunction with a sealed glass ampule containing 
a solution of 5% ZnCl2, 45% ethanol, and 50% water 
for decontamination of skin and personal equipment. 
Chloramine-B dissolves in water and produces 
a caustic solution. However the presence of the 
ZnCl2 maintains the pH of the solution at between 
5 and 6. Related decontaminants are chloramine-T 
(sodium paratoluenesulfochloramine), dichloramine-B 
(benzenesulfodichloramide) and dichloramine-T (para-
toluenesulfochloramine). 
• Hydrogen peroxide (H2O2) is a less caustic agent. 
It has long been used in the medical community as a 
biological sterilizer. Solutions of H2O2 with addition of 
peroxide activators such as carbonate, bicarbonate, 
and molybdate is used with cosolvents such as butanol, 
ethanol, isopropanol, and surfactants to produce 
rapid decontamination of CWAs such as HD, and 
G agents. Decontamination occurs via generation 
of the nucleophile peroxy anion, OOH¯. Addition of 
peroxyacetic acid to H2O2 increases the oxidizing 
power of solution. Unfortunately hydrogen peroxide 
is unstable and breaks down into nontoxic products: 
water and oxygen. The diluted form of hydrogen 
peroxide 3-10%, is commercially available for home use. 
The professional decontamination solution contains 
mixtures of hydrogen peroxide (11-30%), activators 
such as sodium bicarbonate, and cosolvents such as 
t-butanol. Cosolvents increase the contact between 
H2O2 and the chemical agents. The activators increase 
the effectiveness of H2O2 and reaction speed. For 
example, the initial half-life for GB in neutral peroxide 
is 67 hours. When bicarbonate (0.037 M NaHCO3) is 
added to the solution, half-life for the reaction is <1 
minute. The reaction proceeds with the initial loss of 
fluoride. Sulphur mustard (HD) is oxidized fairly slowly in 
a solution of 1.3 mL of 30% H2O2 and 1.9 mL of t-butanol. 
The solutions of H2O2 greater than 20%, with additions 
of t-butanol and bicarbonate (<1 M) decreases the 
reaction half-life to < 2 minutes. Solid urea peroxide 
can be used instead of peroxide solutions. When the 
molybdate is used instead of bicarbonate, the solution 
oxidizes the HD two orders of magnitude faster at the 
low temperature through generation of either singlet 
oxygen or peroxomolybdate such as MoO(OO)3
2— or 
Mo(OO)4
2—.The perhydrolysis of H2O2, however, occurs 
slower than hypochlorite oxidation,  but selectively 
yields the non-vesicant sulfoxide.
• Vaporized hydrogen peroxide (VHP) is a 
patented process of oxidizing fumigation. The vapor is 
generated from concentrated peroxide solutions (>30% 
H2O2). At present this technology is commercially used 
in the fumigation of cabinets and to disinfect surfaces. 
VHP is under experimental investigation as a CWA 
decontamination technology. Modified vaporous hydrogen 
peroxide (mVHP) contains low levels of ammonia gas. 
These technologies (both VHP and mVHP) have been 
tested in the laboratory for efficacy against CWA. At a 
concentration of 250 ppm and with a contact time of 24 
hours, mHVP reduced many CWAs to a simple products. 
Although H2O2 is not corrosive, concentrated vapor is toxic 
and interacts with many surfaces, including concrete. 
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• Peroxygen Oxidants (Peroxy Acids)
o Oxone® is the commercial mixture of: 2 KHSO5 – 
K2SO4 – KHSO4. The active ingredient of this mixture 
is potassium peroxymonosulfate (KHSO5). It is a 
relatively stable, commercially available compound. 
Oxone® dissolved in water produces an acidic solution. 
It can be used for detoxification of HD, but is not 
suitable for decontamination of G-agents. Oxone, has 
the pH of 2.3 at 20°C.  Oxone was tested against HD. 
In a solution of 0.05 M HD, 0.1 M Oxone, and 15 vol 
% N-methyl-2-pyrrolidone (added to help dissolve the 
HD), HD was oxidized immediately to the sulfoxide, 
which converted within an hour to the sulfone. It 
has been observed that N-methyl-2-pyrrolidone at 
a level of ~ 20% does little to improve the solubility 
of HD and that it causes the Oxone to decompose. 
Oxone does not oxidize G-agents, but it is acidic 
enough to catalyze their slow hydrolysis. Oxone, 
like other peroxygen-containing oxidants (especially 
m-chloroperoxybenzoic acid and magnesium 
monoperoxyphthalate) are effective against HD. But 
it should be pointed out that organic peroxides tend to 
be dangerously unstable.
o Meta-Chloroperoxybenzoic acid (m-CPBA) 
is a strong oxidizing agent (C7H5ClO3) available as a 
powder. It is not particularly stable. m-CPBA can be 
used for the oxidation of HD (oxidation occurs at the 
sulphur atom).
o Magnesium monoperoxyphthalate (MMPP; 
[HO2CC6H4CO3]2 Mg]) is a stable, water-soluble, solid 
peroxyacid that has been used as an antimicrobial. 
MMPP was active in oxidizing/detoxifying of HD.
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Following large-scale use of chemical weapons in World 
War I, extensive preparations were made to further develop 
chemical warfare and increase its capacity. Even though 
never used on the European battlefield, large amounts 
of chemical weapons remained after the end of the war. 
The victors chose to take responsibility for the disposal 
any chemical munitions found in their area of oversight. In 
addition to being a cheap method of disposal, the belief 
was that the vast amounts of water in the oceans would 
neutralise and absorb the dangerous substances. 
British and US military administrations have dumped their 
share of munition outside of Baltic Area (in Skagerrak 
and in the Atlantic Ocean). The Soviet Union dumped at 
least 50,000 tonnes of chemical munitions containing an 
estimated 15,000 tonnes of chemical warfare agents in the 
Baltic Sea, primarily in the Bornholm Basin. Other official 
dumping sites are the Little Belt area and the Gotland 
Deep. In addition to these sites, dumping took place en 
route from Wolgast, where vast amounts of chemical 
munitions were stored.
Surveys performed by CHEMSEA in the main area of 
interest, the Gotland Deep, recorded almost 40,000 
objects, of which roughly 17,000 were later classified as 
probable munitions and 33 wrecks, which could potentially 
contain chemical weapons. Taking into account the visual 
confirmation of more than 250 of those targets, it appears 
that 50% of such objects may actually be regarded as 
chemical munitions.
Furthermore, CHEMSEA has found indications of chemical 
weapon dumping worth following up at the unofficial 
dumping sites of Slupsk Furrow and the Gdansk Deep.
Results from studies on cod health indicate no significant 
generic health effects on cod in CW dumpsites compared 
to reference sites. However, at lower organisational levels, 
such as organ, tissue, cellular and subcellular levels, some 
stress responses could be recorded in cod in CW dumpsites 
using the applied suite of biomarkers. Supporting this, 
higher stress responses were also observed in mussels 
deployed closer to the dumped CW (65 m) compared to 
the respective reference site and to mussels caged closer 
to the water surface (35 m).
The often anoxic conditions in the water bodies surrounding 
the dumped CW in the deep basins of the Baltic Sea 
limit the potential of common biological effect monitoring 
approaches in the field. If oxygen concentrations fall below 
2 ml/L in the bottom water, marine organisms tend to 
migrate to more oxygenated waters. Therefore, a direct 
exposure of living organisms to the most polluted water 
bodies is unlikely to occur.
However, it is well known that species such as cod can 
be found in water layers with very low oxygen levels and 
thus at least a temporary risk of direct contact of cod or 
other species with munitions or released toxic compounds 
of CWA cannot be excluded.
It is necessary to extend research and monitoring 
activities both on a time scale, to reduce variability coming 
from changes in environmental conditions, and on a 
geographical scale, so that dumping areas without oxygen 
depletion (e.g. Skagerrak) can be included to create a 
comprehensive monitoring approach. Further, more efforts 
should be focused on laboratory exposure approaches 
using different ecologically relevant key species to 
assess biological effects and uptake mechanisms of 
toxic compounds leaking from dumped CWA on exposed 
organisms.
Different environmental factors like temperature, salinity, 
oxygen presence or depletion, sediment type and chemistry 
or presence of bacteria, as well as their combination affect 
chemical processes in the marine environment. Chemicals 
undergo constant transformations and change their 
structure and properties. Therefore the main objective 
in detecting chemical warfare agents in environmental 
samples was focused on their different degradation 
products. Derivatives or oxidation products of sulphur 
mustard, Adamsite, Clark I and Clark II, triphenylarsine, 
Lewisite I and Lewisite II were found in sediments. Despite 
differences between parent chemicals and derivatives, most 
CWA degradation products have similar toxic properties as 
the chemicals they originate from. Furthermore, remaining 
CWA derivatives have lower breakdown rates and can 
be considered as persistent pollutants. Nearly one third 
of samples collected in the CHEMSEA project contained 
at least one trace of chemical munitions. In comparison, 
sulphur mustard was only detected intact in one sample. 
CWA pollution is most clearly visible in the Bornholm 
Deep. In this area nearly all analysed samples contained 
CWA derivatives. Arsenic containing CWA were found in 
14 samples from a total of 21 collected in the Bornholm 
Basin area. Total arsenic concentrations were also elevated 
in that region compared to background levels. Only in 
samples taken on the transect within growing distance 
from the primary or secondary Bornholm dumpsite 
did concentrations of arsenic decrease and no arsenic 
containing CWA were found in the sediments. 
In the Gotland Deep dumping area the situation is more 
diversified. A number of sediment samples did not contain 
CWA pollution and total arsenic concentrations did not 
show continuous spatial distribution despite high mean 
concentration. Based on this, it can be suggested that 
pollution of sediments with CWA is local and strongly 
dependant on spot environmental features. This also 
shows that the disposal of chemical weapon was more 
spread within the Gotland dumpsite. 
In the Gdansk Deep area concerned as a potential dumping 
site, half of the samples analysed were confirmed for 
pollution with CWA and mean arsenic concentration was 
also elevated in comparison to the reference area. 
In all areas of interest there is a visible relation between 
total arsenic concentration and the presence of arsenic 
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containing chemicals related to chemical weapons, 
although only in very few cases did arsenic contents 
exceed the biogeochemical background estimated for the 
whole Baltic Sea.
According to literature estimates for corrosion and 
leaching duration, the natural processes affecting CWA 
transformation as well as specific environmental conditions 
it is possible that the transition rate of toxic chemicals from 
the remaining weapons to the surrounding environment will 
constantly increase in time. Further monitoring of chemical 
pollution in dumping areas is necessary. It is important 
for estimating the status of chemical ammunition and 
containers and for further surveying threats of this 
pollution to the environment. 
Accidents during the last decades have confirmed the risk 
of catch or extraction of CW in maritime areas marked on 
navigational charts as dumping sites, as fishing operations 
are still carried out in these areas, despite official bans. 
Chemical munitions continue to be a threat for fishermen. 
During the last ten years (2003 - 2012), there have been 
44 reported incidents of CW catch. Even though the 
numbers are declining, the problem remains, as there are 
dangerous objects in the Baltic Sea both inside and outside 
known dumping locations. CHEMSEA has confirmed the 
hypothesis of munitions being thrown overboard while en 
route to designated dumping sites, which means the risk 
of contact with hazardous agents extends far behind the 
limits of official dumping sites.
Activities taking place on the seabed of the Baltic Sea 
need to acknowledge the presence of chemical munitions 
and the potential dangers they constitute. Additionally, 
there are environmental factors that need to be taken into 
account as chemical munitions remain on the seabed far 
longer than originally believed.
Nowadays, rapidly growing activity on the seafloor in the 
form of temporal or permanent facilities (e.g. monitoring 
stations, offshore wind farms, sea cables and pipelines, 
resource extraction) increases the risk of coming into 
contact with CW and bringing them onboard. Thus, the risk 
of contact and contamination is not limited to fishermen 
but applies also to offshore industry employees and other 
groups working at sea. These groups should be firstly 
aware of the risk existence and secondly ready to take 
precautionary actions to minimise the threat. CHEMSEA 
conducted wide area research in the context of awareness 
assessment resulting in the Awareness Training Program, 
ready to be carried out in the Baltic states.
Hereby, CHEMSEA encourages national 
authorities to implement the Awareness Training 
Program as mandatory for selected target 
groups.
This sea scenario, however, is not the only scenario 
expected. The last decades have confirmed that the threat 
posed by CW may easily reach coastlines in the form of 
munitions pieces washed ashore, creating a need to react 
not only at sea but also on land.
Analysis of national contingency procedures and plans 
currently available in case of incidents involving chemical 
munitions revealed that although national procedures are 
well established, no transboundary response plans are 
in place and responsibilities within Baltic Sea countries 
are divided between different entities, depending on the 
country in question.
In order to minimise discrepancies, CHEMSEA 
worked out a unified model contingency plan and 
encourages national authorities to implement it 
in the context of crisis management procedures.
In order to continue the research on the state of chemical 
munitions in the Baltic Sea and continously monitor the 
threat, CHEMSEA supports the suggestion of 
HELCOM MUNI to create a database of incidents 
and a reporting system run by the Secretariat, 
using a jointly developed system (CHEMSEA/
MUNI).
Another aspect of the maritime industry are operations 
conducted directly on or in the sediment layer in the 
vicinity of chemical munitions. Such activities may damage 
the encasements of chemical munitions that have not yet 
lost their integrity, generating threats to humans and the 
environment.
Therefore, prior to any offshore operation an appropriate 
methodology of risk assessment must be followed. 
The model approach was introduced during the biggest 
investment of recent years in the Baltic Sea area, i.e. 
the Nord Stream pipeline construction. The documented 
experiences of the Nord Stream pipeline laying project 
between 2005 and 2011 could be a model for future project 
plans. In order to facilitate Wide Area Assessment and 
Detailed Survey phases within the model methodology, 
CHEMSEA worked out a framework of detection, 
classification and mapping of CWA that consists of:
• Desktop research of historical documents and munitions 
examples in order to define sizes and shapes of objects 
searched for
• Hydroacoustic detection with multiple survey tools
• Magnetometric detection
• ROV / visual confirmation
• Post-processing of data into a geospatial database and 
mapping
Based on CHEMSEA research, hydroacoustic surveys 
would be advised as the first step in both environmental 
impact assessment and work site selection in the area 
where suspected dumped munitions are located. It is 
advisable to perform sonar survey using side scan sonars, 
multi beam echosounders and sub-bottom profilers.
Multi-beam echo sounders and side scan sonars provide a 
detailed picture of contours of the sea floor and of objects 
lying on the seabed, whereas sub-bottom profilers penetrate 
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deep into the material on the sea bottom to show a cross-
section of the seabed. To exclude natural or non-munitions 
objects, the sonar survey should be complemented 
with other techniques, such as magnetometry used for 
detecting ferrous items.
The aforementioned survey techniques generate an 
enormous amount of data, which then needs to be fused 
and processed using GIS computer software, widely 
available on the commercial market. The resulting output 
constitutes an enhanced graph display of the surveyed area 
in the form of detailed charts aimed to support decision-
making processes in the area of human maritime activities.
There is also a risk of retrieval of contaminated 
sediments during dredging operations. In the CHEMSEA 
Findings  suggestions for how to incorporate sediments 
contaminated with chemical munitions  into existing 
waste management procedures are included, pointing at 
specific risks associated with such material and available 
decontamination procedures.
The overall conclusion stemming from the CHEMSEA 
project is that chemical munitions dumpsites, although not 
representing an immediate danger, will continue to be a 
problem for the Baltic Sea. On one hand, they represent 
scattered point sources of pollution of unknown magnitude 
and difficult to control. On the other hand, they are a major 
economic impairment, making the Baltic Sea a less safe 
and potentially more costly area for investment. From an 
environmental point of view they present a risk for marine 
biota through chronic exposure, though not directly for 
consumers. However, the amount of available data does 
not enable predictions on the development of situation. If 
a steady pace of corrosion and leakage is maintained, the 
problem is long lasting but local, and eventually degradation 
processes will remove most of the associated threat. 
However, if leakage increases, the degradation processes 
will not balance the leakage and the problem may become 
severe. Further studies are needed, especially for time 
trends, including the magnitude of leakage and the rate 
of corrosion and transport of contaminants to determine 
which scenario is more probable. 
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The CHEMSEA project, which comprises 11 research 
institutes from six Baltic Sea states, wishes to highlight 
the following items based on three years of research on 
chemical warfare agents (CWA) in the Baltic Sea:
• Detailed surveys of the well-known Gotland Deep 
dumpsite, the Gdansk Deep, and along the post-war 
transport routes revealed a previously unknown extent 
of dumped munitions containing CWA. Modelled and 
measured bottom currents and their directions show that 
sediments polluted by CWA degradation products can 
be transported outside of the dumpsites, thus creating 
diffuse sources of contaminants to the neighbouring 
areas. 
• Studies on the possible impacts of CWA and their 
degradation products on Baltic Sea biota show 
negative health impacts on tested marine organisms in 
the vicinity of dumpsite areas, especially at Bornholm 
Deep. The observed effects include changes in disease 
prevalence, genotoxicity, and more alterations on cell 
and tissue levels compared to the reference site. It is 
nevertheless still not possible to definitively conclude 
that these effects are caused by CWA exposure. Further 
studies are currently being performed.
• Although established national contingency procedures 
and plans for dealing with chemical munitions incidents 
exist, no transboundary response plans that clearly 
clarify responsibilities among and within the Baltic Sea 
states are currently in place.
• Awareness of risks and emergency procedures among 
fishermen and other potentially affected groups on 
encounters with chemical munitions are generally low.
• Regulations for the management of dredged sediments 
do not specifically mention CWA degradation products 
as a factor to be examined during identification of 
hazardous waste. 
ChemseA poliCy pApeR 
suBmitted to helCom
CHEMSEA proposes the following:
• HELCOM takes into consideration to formally recognize 
the probability of further encounters with objects 
containing CWA in areas surrounding the Bornholm 
Basin dumpsite, the Gotland Deep dumpsite, the Little 
Belt area, the Gdańsk Deep, and along the transport 
routes from Wolgast Harbour as potential hazards.
• HELCOM member states consider to officially recognize 
that CWA degradation products exist as contaminants 
in the Baltic Sea marine environment, with multiple 
diffuse sources located on the seabed.
• HELCOM RESPONSE Group is requested to draw 
attention to the current discrepancies in national 
procedures and systems of compensation regarding 
CWA incidents, and the absence of an adequate 
transboundary dimension in the existing contingency 
plans.
• CHEMSEA fully supports the suggestion of HELCOM 
MUNI to create a database of incidents and reporting 
system run by the HELCOM Secretariat, using a jointly 
developed system (CHEMSEA/MUNI).
• Baltic Sea states are encouraged to include training of 
emergency procedures in case of accidental recovery of 
chemical munitions as part of mandatory trainings for 
fishermen and other groups potentially under risk when 
operating in the Baltic Sea region.
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Institute of Oceanology of the Polish Academy of Sciences 
(IO PAN)
The Institute of Oceanology of the Polish Academy of Sciences (IO PAN) conducts 
scientific research in shelf seas and coastal regions in the Baltic and European Arctic 
Seas. IO PAN was the lead partner in the CHEMSEA project.
Polish Naval Academy (PNA)
The Polish Naval Academy (PNA) is a military university under the supervision of 
the Ministry of National Defence and a military unit carrying out missions related 
to national defence. It is also a military scientific institution, based in Gdynia, with 
expertise in operational oceanography, including underwater operations relating to 
dumped munitions.
Military University of Technology (MUT)
The Military University of Technology (MUT) in Warsaw is a state military technical 
school at the university level. It is one of the most experienced entities regarding 
CWA security issues in Poland and is the operator of the largest polish CWA 
laboratory. The Institute of Chemistry at MUT is a full-time organisational unit of 
the Faculty of New Technologies and Chemistry, established to conduct teaching 
and education, research and training of scientific staff in the disciplines of ecology 
and environmental monitoring, explosives and fireworks, hazardous materials and 
chemical rescue.
Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI)
The Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) is an assignment-based authority 
under the Swedish Ministry of Defence, specialising in research, methods and 
technology development, as well as studies in the context of defence and security. 
Both military and civil assignments include security policy studies and analyses in 
defence and security, assessment of different types of threats, systems for control 
and management of crises, protection against and management of hazardous 
substances, IT-security and studies concerning the potential of new sensors.
Swedish Maritime Administration (SMA)
The Swedish Maritime Administration (SMA), located in Norrköping, is the safe 
shipping and nautical charting authority responsible for hydrographic surveying 
and fairway maintenance in Swedish waters as well as technical development in 
these fields. Their areas of activity include pilotage, fairway service, maritime traffic 
information, icebreaking, hydrography, maritime and aeronautical search and rescue 
and seamen services.
Finnish Institute for Verification of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention (VERIFIN)
VERIFIN, the Finnish Institute for Verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, 
is located in the Department of Chemistry at the University of Helsinki. VERIFIN 
is one of the world’s leading institutes in the field of analysis of chemical warfare 
agents in environmental samples. During the last years the Institute has also 
focussed on method development and analysis of biomarkers for chemical warfare 
agents in various samples like human urine/plasma and fish and mussel tissue 
samples. VERIFIN is an accredited laboratory. It is also the designated laboratory of 
the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and a National 
Authority of Finland defined by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) working 




Finnish Environment Institute (SYKE)
The Finnish Environment Institute (SYKE) is a state agency under the Finnish 
Ministry of Environment carrying most of the environmental research as well as the 
coordination of national environmental monitoring.
Thünen Institute of Fisheries Ecology (TI-FI)
The Thünen Institute of Fisheries Ecology (TI-FI) is one of the 14 science institutes 
within the Johann Heinrich von Thünen Institute, Federal Research Institute for Rural 
Areas, Forestry and Fisheries, under the German Ministry of Food and Agriculture. 
It has expertise in agriculture, forest ecology and fisheries. TI-FI addresses issues 
related to the effects of anthropogenic pressures on marine ecosystems, with a focus 
on the effects in fish from the North and Baltic Seas. It is responsible for national 
chemical and biological monitoring with regards to hazardous substances and their 
biological effects on biota from offshore regions.
Alfred Wegener Institute Helmholtz Centre for Polar  
and Marine Research (AWI)
The Alfred Wegener Institute Helmholtz Centre for Polar and Marine Research (AWI) 
in Bremerhaven is Germany’s leading institute for polar and marine research. The 
AWI Department Ecological Chemistry has broad experience in the development of 
indicators and expert systems for integrated analysis of chemical and biological data 
including the assessment of contaminant impact on the marine environment.
European CBRNE Center
The European CBRNE Center is a research consortium consisting of Umeå University, 
the Swedish Defence Research Agency, Västerbotten County Council, the City of 
Umeå, the Swedish Armed Forces National CBRN Defence Centre and the Swedish 
National Fortification Agency. The Center coordinates projects and exercises in 
the area of hazardous substances and conducts research and training concerning 
security and vulnerability relating to incidents with chemical, biological, radiological, 
nuclear and explosive subjects. The Center’s work includes everything from smaller 
regional projects to larger international EU project and task assignments.
Lithuanian Environmental Protection Agency (LEPA)
The Lithuanian Environmental Protection Agency (LEPA) is charged with organising, 
coordinating and performing environmental monitoring and implemention of the 
Lithuanian policy on control of hazardous substances. The LEPA Marine Research 
Department has experience with assessments of the environment state at chemical 
munitions dumpsites in the Lithuanian economic zone and in publishing guidelines for 
fished munitions in Lithuania. 
Biuro Projektów Fidler
Biuro Projektów Fidler is a Berlin-based consulting company specialised in application 
and management of international projects funded by EU donor programmes. They are 
mainly active in Central-Eastern Europe and Scandinavia, covering such programmes 
as INTERREG and ENPI Cross-border Cooperation Programmes, Life+, BONUS 
and the Framework Programmes for Research and Technological Development. 
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In addition to the CHEMSEA partners, several other 
organisations declared their strong interest in the project 
and their willingness to become Associated Organisations 
with a clearly defined commitment and an active role in 
the project. They are also important in terms of granting 
permits for scientific activities in the respective national 
waters.
In Poland, the General Inspectorate for Environment 
(GIOS) will make sure that project guidelines and other 
results find application in the realisation of the Baltic Sea 
Strategy. The Maritime Office Gdynia, the authority 
managing the Polish territorial waters, also supported the 
project and intends to implement CHEMSEA guidelines 
and other results and tools. The project also had the support 
of the Marshall Office of Pomorskie Voivodeship 
and the Department of Security and Crisis 
Management of Pomeranian Voivodeship, who 
will ensure a policy impact on a regional level in Poland. 
Importantly, the National Sea Fisheries Institute 
in Gdynia will link project results to the Polish fishery 
sector.
In Sweden, CHEMSEA was supported by the Swedish 
Coast Guard, who is the competent authority for 
response to harmful substances at sea. Even though 
the Swedish Navy, MWDC (Mine Warfare Data 
Center) is not an official Associated Partner, they took 
an active role in the assessment and characterisation 
work, providing expertise on CWA-detection methods. 
The Swedish Geological Survey (SGU) aided the 
project by providing geological, environmental and spatial 
planning information.
In Finland, CHEMSEA had the support of the Ministry 
of Environment. 
In Lithuania the Nature Research Center (NRC) 
provided provided their expertise on environmental 
genotoxicity of CWAs.
CHEMSEA was also supported by the Atlantic Branch 
of the Shirshov Institute of Oceanology of the 
Russian Academy of Sciences (AB SIO RAS). AB 
SIO RAS is the leading source of data on underwater 
munitions in the Baltic Sea. In cooperation with IO PAN, 
they provide their data and expertise on the localisation 
and other parameters of CWAs.
Additionally, IDUM, the International Dialogue on 
Underwater Munitions and SIPRI, the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute, an 
independent institute dedicated to research and 
monitoring of munitions related issues, both shared their 
experience and networks with the CHEMSEA project. 
IDUM has been also actively involved in the project 
activities, interpretation of the data and preparation of 
Guidelines.
Last but not least, the HELCOM secretariat was aware 
of and highly supportive of the CHEMSEA project. 
Project objectives and activities were well in line with 
the HELCOM MUNI group as well as the HELCOM 
Response group activities. CHEMSEA  cooperated 
closely with the HELCOM MUNI working group in order to 
create the most synergies and ensure the largest possible 
impact of produced results.
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At least 50,000 metric tonnes of chemical munitions have been dumped in the Baltic Sea since the World War II, many of them containing toxic 
substances. Uncertainty still exists about the location of all dumping areas, the content and condition of the munitions or how they behave under 
Baltic Sea conditions. CHEMSEA (Chemical Munitions, Search and Assessment) is a flagship project of the Baltic Sea Region Strategy, financed 
by the EU Baltic Sea Region Programme 2007-2013. It has a budget of € 4.5M, part-financed by the European Union through the European 
Regional Development Fund. The project seeks to close existing knowledge gaps about dumped chemical warfare agents (CWA) in the Baltic Sea 
by mapping and characterizing dumping sites, developing guidelines in order to reduce potential threats to the environment and fishermen and by 
preparing a region-wide joint blue print of contingency plan for cases of CWA leakages.
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